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Stakeholder Collaboration  
as an Alternative to Cost-Benefit Analysis  
Karen Bradshaw* 
This Article compares and contrasts cost-benefit analysis with 
“collaborative analysis” in agency decision-making. While mathematical 
models drive cost-benefit analysis, ongoing stakeholder negotiations drive 
collaborative analysis.  Cost-benefit analysis relies on economists 
inputting numerical values into a model, whereas collaborative analysis 
relies on the diverse perspectives of groups and individuals affected by an 
agency’s decision. Administrative law scholars have exhaustively 
researched cost-benefit analysis while overlooking widespread agency 
reliance on collaborative analysis. This Article advances the novel 
observation that legislatures and courts sometimes treat collaborative 
analysis and cost-benefit analysis as interchangeable.  
Administrative law scholars might find it unorthodox, even 
irresponsible, to equate the deliberative process of average citizens with 
numerical calculations performed by economists. Yet, collaborative 
analysis works well in several contexts when numerical analysis does not: 
where data are scarce, burdens are unevenly distributed, normative values 
are at stake, and conditions are changing. Under such circumstances, 
agency officials report that collaborative analysis creates better outcomes, 
secures ex ante social approval of policies, provides adaptive decision-
making, and reduces conflict and litigation risk relative to alternative 
tools. Despite the benefits of collaborative analysis and its surprisingly 
 
*   Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University; 
Sustainability Scholar, Global Institute of Sustainability, Arizona State University;  
Affiliate Faculty, The Classical Liberal Institute, New York University School of Law. This 
Article draws on research the author performed as an Academic Consultant for the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, which provided financial support for the 
research. I received valuable feedback from Zachary Gubler, Robert Fischman, Rhett  
Larson, Jonathan Masur, Eric Posner, Erin Scharff. Participants at the American Law and 
Economics Association Meeting at Boston University and the Managing Environmental 
Risks: Markets, Regulation, and Adaptive Learning Workshop at Duke University were also 
instrumental. I also thank Sari Amiel, Whittney Barth, Tyler Carlton, Amanda Garrey, 
Challie Facemire, Hayden Hilliard, Jamie Lee, Alissa Mack, and Paul Youchuck for their 
outstanding research assistance. 
001.BRADSHAW_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
656 
 
widespread use, its potential remains largely untapped. In identifying and 
defining collaborative analysis for the first time, this Article provides 
agencies, stakeholders, and courts the tools necessary to understand 
collaborative analysis and tap into its benefits. 
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Humans have managed risk since time immemorial. Our 
ancestors weighed the benefits of gathering food against being 
attacked by wildlife. Early humans did not make such choices by 
plugging numbers into a formula; they talked in groups about what 
could happen, drew on the wisdom of elders, and tried small 
experiments to advance knowledge collectively.1 
Humans still face risks, ranging from climate change to nuclear 
disaster. We imagine that our mechanisms for managing risks have 
evolved to become more sophisticated. In the modern 
administrative state, agencies play a key role in regulating activities 
to constrain risks to an acceptable level.2 Agencies make thousands 
of decisions on acceptable risk levels every year, ranging from 
vaccine recommendations to airplane cargo loads. Some agencies 
use scientific and economic techniques unimaginable to our 
ancestors, such as cost-benefit analysis.3 In countless cases, agencies 
reliably make good decisions using a top-down framework 
informed by quantitative tools.4 
Yet, administrative law scholars tend to overestimate the 
importance of numerical approaches to agency decision-making.5 
 
 1. These examples highlight the distinction between intuitive and analytical 
reactions to risk. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 5–6 (2007). 
 2. To provide one example, consider the role of risk assessment and management in 
the environmental context. The Environmental Protection Agency defines risk assessment as 
“a process in which information is analyzed to determine if an environmental hazard might 
cause harm to exposed person and ecosystems.” OFFICE OF THE SCI. ADVISOR, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, AN EXAMINATION OF EPA RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 2 
(2004). “Environmental risk management seeks to determine what environmental risks exist 
and then determine how to manage those risk [sic] in a way best suited to protect human 
health and the environment.” U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Risk Management, EPA.gov, 
https://www.epa.gov/risk/risk-management (last updated May 1, 2017). 
 3. Indeed, reliance on data-driven risk assessment has become the default practice of 
the legal establishment. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1; Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353 (2001). 
 4. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1. 
 5. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION IX (2002); Kagan, supra note 3 (noting the “ever-widening appreciation of the 
role of cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment in the formulation of 
administrative policy”); Alan H. Sanstad, Abating Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Electric Power 
Generation: Model Uncertainty and Regulatory Epistemology, 44 J. L. STUD., S423, S423 (2015) 
(“Computational modeling has become a primary regulatory methodology in the decades 
since the modern American environmental policy regime was established . . . .”). As a field, 
administrative law tends to focus on a set of agencies whose policy choices lend themselves 
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In truth, agencies do not use cost-benefit analysis to inform the vast 
majority of regulatory decisions. Fewer than two percent of 
regulations promulgated in the past ten years, or 609 of 36,255 final 
rules, resulted from cost-benefit analysis.6 How do agencies 
formulate policy for the other ninety-eight percent of regulations?7  
In 2017, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
commissioned an Office of the Chairman Report to study how 
agencies make policy choices and manage risk without using cost-
benefit analysis.8 The Report showed that thirteen federal land and 
resource management agencies rarely, if ever, used numerical 
decision-making tools to guide policy. Instead, agencies relied 
heavily on “stakeholder collaborations” as a substitute for formula-
based, numerical decision-making. In a recent article, I provided a 
descriptive, longitudinal overview of stakeholder collaborations. 
This Article builds upon that foundational work to advance a bold 
claim: In practice, agencies, legislatures, and courts have privileged 
collaborative analysis as equivalent to cost-benefit analysis. 
Administrative law scholarship should add collaborative analysis 
to the cannon of agency decision-making tools.  
“Collaborative analysis” describes agencies’ use of groups of 
diverse non-agency stakeholders to develop policy 
recommendations. It derives from familiar participatory 
governance tools, such as responsive regulation, collaborative 
adaptive management, and stakeholder collaborations.9 This 
Article advances a novel claim, however: The relational process of 
 
to cost-benefit analysis, such as the Environmental Protection Agency. Administrative law 
scholarship tends to overlook the federal land and resource management agencies that 
employ the tool of collaborative analysis discussed in this article, which includes agencies 
like the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park Service. 
 6. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2017 
DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (2017). Some scholars 
suggest that the two percent of decisions guided by cost-benefit analysis are the most 
important decisions because they surpass a certain dollar threshold. 
 7. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 195, 197-200 (2018); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Norming in 
Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1384-85 (2019) (describing agencies “norming” by 
choosing standard industry practices to set a regulatory level). 
 8.  KAREN BRADSHAW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STAKEHOLDER 
COLLABORATIONS FOR MANAGING LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2017). 
 9.  AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, infra note 109, at 87; Christine Parker, Twenty Years of 
Responsive Regulation: An Appreciation and Appraisal, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE. 2, 7 (2013). 
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weighing choices in groups—”collaborative analysis”—is 
analogous to cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, I argue that courts 
should—and do—consider these tools as interchangeable, both 
being evidence of reasoned decision-making and appropriate for 
different circumstances. Collaborative analysis can serve as a 
complement to, or even substitute for, cost-benefit analysis. 
Human analytical potential extends beyond science and 
numbers. Discounting decision-making tools outside of cost-
benefit analysis leaves much on the table.10 When risk is great and 
unknowable, we should rely on the tools that our ancestors used to 
survive attacks by wild animals: human relationships, pooled 
information, and an openness to constant learning in response to 
the natural environment.11 Agencies do precisely this by using 
collaborative analysis to incorporate diverse sources of information 
and analysis. 
This Article compares and contrasts collaborative analysis with 
cost-benefit analysis. I grapple with Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein’s behavioral economics arguments against public 
participation. Collaborative analysis can lead to more accurate 
valuation assessments, Pareto superior outcomes, inclusiveness, 
increased social acceptance, reduce polarization, resource pooling, 
and responsive policy.12 The tool is, however, subject to serious 
concerns, including democratic considerations, capture, a lack of 
inclusiveness, and problematic decision quality.13 
Doctrinally, this Article makes a surprising argument: Existing 
law allows agencies to defend decisions in litigation using 
collaborative analysis, just as they use cost-benefit analysis or even 
an Environmental Impact Statement to support a decision.14 This 
Article traces the basis for this claim in statutory language and 
caselaw. Vitally, it also sets forth a framework to address the 
interwoven questions of (1) the conditions under which 
 
 10. See infra Sections II.B.3 (discussing the diverse information offered  
by traditional ecological knowledge, relational feminism, ecofeminism, resource-users,  
and employees within an industry—none of which are captured through quantitative  
data approaches). 
 11. See Edward H. Hagen & Peter Hammerstein, Game Theory and Human Evolution: A 
Critique of Some Recent Interpretations of Experimental Games, 69 THEORETICAL POPULATION 
BIOLOGY 339, 340–41 (2006). 
 12.  See infra Section II.A. 
 13.  See infra Section II.B. 
 14.  See infra Section III. 
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collaborative analysis are appropriate, and (2) when collaborative 
analysis is sufficiently inclusive.15 
Courts should read statutes about agency decision-making in 
concert with laws requiring stakeholder input. Courts should also 
afford deference to agencies’ decisions based on information 
gathered through democratic participation.16 This shifts judicial 
inquiry away from second-guessing empirical risk assessments and 
toward evaluating the agencies’ procedural fairness.17 Ostensibly 
neutral qualitative tools are largely incomprehensible to non-
experts;18 they can serve as a smokescreen for highly politicized 
agency decisions and judicial analysis.19 In contrast, courts are 
expert in evaluating procedure and democratic inclusion.  Thus, 
democratic legitimacy may require broadened, formalized 
acceptance of citizen input as a valid part of policy analysis.20 
Part I provides a case study of an agency changing from data-
driven analysis to collaborative analysis. It expands upon the case 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id.; see also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (1990) (“[C]ourts simply should not play a significant role in public 
risk assessment and management, partly because they share the uninformed popular 
mindset and partly because they are inept assessors and managers in any event.”);  
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 (1985) (“[T]he judicial system is . . . incapable of engaging in  
the aggregative calculus of risk created and risk averted that progressive public-
risk management requires.”). 
 18. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, 115 ETHICS 351, 380 
(2005); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1971) (describing the use of mathematics in criminal trials as 
“casting a spell” over courts and juries, even when the methodology and outcomes are 
deeply flawed). 
 19. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 899, 902 (2015) (“[Cost-benefit analysis can] provide 
camouflage, reducing the transparency of a rulemaking process . . . [and can] (1) obscure the 
issues at play, (2) raise the risks for lawmakers to question regulators, (3) shift power from 
Congress to regulators, (4) hide risk seeking, and (5) favor factions in distributional struggles 
among lawmakers.”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 781 (2008); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of  
Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083, 1097-98 (2007); cf. Jody Freeman & Adrian  
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 S. CT. REV. 51, 96 
(acknowledging politicization but arguing that the Supreme Court pushed back against it 
through “expertise-forcing”). 
 20. Practically, agency collaboration with stakeholders improves substantive 
decisions, lessens litigation risk, builds trusts, and increases social acceptance of policies. See 
infra Section II.A. 
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study to define collaborative analysis as the practice of obtaining 
ongoing input from diverse stakeholders. 
Part II compares and contrasts cost-benefit analysis with 
collaborative analysis. It highlights the benefits of collaborative 
analysis relative to cost-benefit analysis, such as producing more 
inclusive decision-making and better valuations. It acknowledges, 
however, concerns with the tool, emphasizing best practices to 
include marginalized populations and avoid agency capture. 
Defining the situations in which collaborative analysis is (and is 
not) appropriate provides crucial insight into the benefits and 
limitations of this approach. 
Part III presents a novel doctrinal analysis of how courts can 
assess the legality of agencies relying on collaborative analysis. 
Indeed, I argue that courts are better positioned to analyze the 
procedural fairness of collaborative analysis than the empirical 
questions imbedded in cost-benefit analysis. Despite its 
widespread use, collaborative analysis’s potential is not yet fully 
realized. I conclude by providing suggestions for how it can be 
expanded to guide policymaking in other areas. 
I. REVEALING THE TOOL OF COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS 
This Part presents a specific, real-world case study of an agency 
transitioning from data-driven management to collaborative 
analysis (Section I.A). It then expands upon this particular example 
to provide a generalized overview of agencies’ use of stakeholder 
collaborations and the resulting collaborative analysis (Section I.B). 
A. Case Study: The Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working Group 
In Alaska, the caribou, or North American reindeer, are neither 
domesticated nor herded. Yet many stakeholders have strong 
interests in caribou herd management, including commercial 
hunting guides, recreational hunters, wildlife conservationists, and 
Alaskan Native Communities. Caribou migrate through a large 
landscape owned by a mix of federal, state, native, corporate, and 
private landholders.21 Landowners have differing, sometimes 
 
 21. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN 6 
(2011). Wildlife habitat for large mammals frequently spans many diverse landowners, a 
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conflicting, approaches to wildlife management.22 State and federal 
agencies divide management responsibilities according to a 
complicated system. 
This case study focuses on agency decision-making regarding 
caribou management. It begins by situating the past and current 
importance of the caribou in indigenous Alaskan culture. Then, it 
describes a series of disastrous top-down, numerically driven 
agency decisions that decimated entire herds of caribou. Finally, 
agency officials with local ties to Alaskan Native Communities 
developed an alternative decision-making tool—collaborative 
analysis—that complemented numerical modeling to lead to better 
agency management. 
1. The historical development of herd management 
Alaskan Native communities have hunted caribou in Alaska 
since time immemorial. After the United States purchased the 
Alaskan territory from Russia, the U.S. government gradually 
began regulating wildlife, including the caribou. These efforts 
largely displaced traditional hunting practices and incorporated 
non-native hunting uses. 
Alaskan Native hunting practices differed sharply from those 
endorsed by state fish and game agencies within the continental 
United States.23 For example, Alaskan Native communities 
historically took many animals during a brief period, consistent 
with the migratory patterns.24 Traditionally, hunters would  
station themselves by a river and harvest the caribou as they swam 
to maximize the take.25 Such hunting practices reflect  
traditional ecological knowledge, an oral history governing the 
 
phenomenon discussed in Challie Facemire & Karen Bradshaw, Biodiversity Loss Viewed 
through the Lens of Mismatched Property Rights, available at https://www.adfg.alaska.gov/ 
static/research/plans/pdfs/wah_management_plan_final_2011.pdf. 
 22. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21. 
 23. There were, of course, traditional Native American practices within  
the continental United States, which Western settlers violated, supplanted, and  
eventually overwrote. 
 24. Interview 16 (on file with the author); see also Ray Barnhardt & Angayuqaq Oscar 
Kawagley, Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Alaska Native Ways of Knowing, 36 
ANTHROPOLOGY & EDUC. Q. 8, 8–9 (2005). 
 25. Id. 
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human relationship with the natural world.26 But, these  
methods contrasted sharply with Western notions of ethical 
hunting practices. 
In the 1900s, Alaskan game wardens used fines, arrests, and 
gun confiscation to punish traditional hunting practices. Such 
enforcement mechanisms bred distrust between Alaskan Native 
communities and Department officials. Against the backdrop of 
sharply different perspectives and a century of distrust, state and 
federal agencies in Alaska continue to manage wildlife upon which 
the lives of some rural Alaskan Native communities depend.27  
In the 1970s, The Alaska Department of Game and Fish 
(“ADFG”) dramatically overestimated the size of the herd and 
issued many hunting permits over the objections of the Alaskan 
Native communities, which resulted in the largest failure in the 
history of state wildlife management. Two caribou herds 
experienced total population collapse—hundreds of thousands of 
caribou died. The result was “one of the worst management 
debacles ever in the State of Alaska, ever.”28 The population 
collapse had devastating effects on rural Alaskan Native 
communities, which depended upon the herds as a primary food 
source. Several American citizens starved to death.29 
 
 
 26. Western scientists and courts are increasingly recognizing traditional ecological 
knowledge as a valid form of scientific information. Id. at 9 (“Until recently, there was very 
little literature that addressed how to get Western scientists and educators to understand 
Native worldviews and ways of knowing as constituting knowledge systems in their own 
right, and even less on what it means for participants when such divergent systems coexist 
in the same person, organization, or community.”). 
 27. A series of laws enacted by Congress in the 1970s, such as the Alaskan National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act, embedded subsistence hunting rights for Alaskan Natives 
and non-native rural Alaskans into federal law. These rights are managed by the Subsistence 
Resource Commission, which reports to Federal Subsistence Regional Advisory Councils 
and the Federal Subsistence Board. Alaska maintains a parallel system, which centralizes 
authority in the Board of Game and Fish and incorporates a broader focus on non-native 
users, including game hunters from other states or countries. 
 28. Telephone Interview with Jim Dau, Wildlife Biologist for Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game (retired) (July 25, 2017) (on file with author), quoted in BRADSHAW, supra note 
8 at 13. 
 29. Today, caribou remain the primary source of sustenance for between forty and 
fifty remote Alaskan Native communities, which can only be reached by airplane, boat, 
snowmachine, or sled dog team. Villagers hunt caribou using snowmachines in the winter 
and powerboats or all-terrain vehicles in the summer and fall. ERNEST S. BURCH JR., CARIBOU 
HERDS OF NORTHWEST ALASKA, 1850–2000, at 45 (Igor Krupnik & Jim Dau eds., 2012). 
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2. “Scientific” management at odds with social realities 
After the population collapse, a complex arrangement between 
Federal Subsistence Advisory Boards and the Alaskan Board of 
Game emerged to govern hunting and fishing regulations. Various 
stakeholders would argue before the State Board of Game, which 
was “not very productive” because the groups had different 
interests, essentially leaving management to the game boards.30 
The Agency turned toward a scientific approach to herd 
management—releasing annual hunting licenses by using 
mathematical models of herd size based on field data collected by 
biologists in helicopters over a few days. The licensure process was 
a top-down effort that prioritized data while neglecting many on-
the-ground realities of rural Alaskan life.31  
For instance, the agency refused to give permits to at least one 
Alaskan Native community because they did not appear at an 
agency-sponsored meeting. Although the agency had failed to 
notify that community about the meeting, the agency nevertheless 
refused to issue hunting licenses to the group, making them choose 
between breaking state hunting laws or starving. In 1970, the 
Western Arctic Herd numbered 243,000, but dropped to 75,000 by 
1976. There was tremendous distrust and anger among the various 
stakeholders. It was clear that using the best-available scientific and 
mathematical models for herd management was not working. 
In 1994, ADFG hosted a multi-day workshop to determine 
objective ways to assess caribou harvest levels.32 After hours and in 
the hallways between sessions, participants began to discuss 
creating a working group devoted to the issue. Collaborative 
strategies were in their infancy in Alaska. Some state employees 
were familiar with the concept from their experience engaging with 
Canadians, whom a former state wildlife biologist described as “a 
decade ahead of Alaskans in terms of working groups.”33 
Eventually, lower-level agency employees from rural Alaska 
gradually formulated a different model for generating social 
 
 30. Interview 1 (on file with author). 
 31. BURCH, supra note 29, at 44. 
 32. Dau, supra note 28. 
 33. Id. 
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acceptance of herd management policies.34 They relied on 
relationships, creating a stakeholder collaboration that met 
regularly to discuss herd conditions. State and federal agency 
officials, hunting guides, and representatives from the Alaskan 
Native communities were some of the parties who comprised the 
stakeholder collaboration.  
3. The emergence of a stakeholder collaboration 
A small group hammered out the concept and structure of the 
Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working Group (WACHWG), the 
focus of which was to have field biologists and affected parties from 
the primary interests come together. The group sought to connect 
researchers and those reliant on caribou and to encourage them to 
have an informal, “nuts and bolts” discussion of the population, to 
offer a unified set of recommendations to the Board of Game that 
would improve its decision-making. A founding member of 
WACHWG noted, “We never envisioned anything formal. We 
wanted it to be informal, because that’s the way villages work[;] 
that’s what people were comfortable with.”35 The WACHWG 
intentionally did not have a chair, seeking to avoid hierarchy. It also 
met in various rural villages, which allowed the local villagers to 
attend meetings. 
For several years, a group of up to nine people would gather for 
a day in Kotzebue or another rural location to discuss forming the 
group. As the idea solidified, it found a receptive source in John 
Coady, the Supervisor for Region 5 of the ADFG, who lived 
through the caribou population collapse debacle in the 1970s. 
Coady allocated a modest amount of the existing regional budget 
to convene meetings, assigned an employee to the collaboration, 
and, as one official noted, “had enough moxie for people to take 
this seriously.”36 
 
 34. ROBERT J. MCMONAGLE, CARIBOU AND CONOCO: RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLITICS IN ALASKA’S ANWR AND BEYOND 2 (2008) (“[U]sing strictly cost-benefit analysis to 
‘solve’ conflicts with conflicting energy and environmental implications is a problematic way 
to go. Actual costs and benefits in these equations tend to be too nebulous or demonstrably 
one-sided.”). 
 35. Dau, supra note 28. 
 36. Id. 
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Early members of the collaboration were poignantly aware of 
the challenges involved in forming a credible group. A former 
ADFG employee recalls: 
It was really tough early on. We were acutely aware of the 
problems with us picking and choosing representatives of the 
various user groups, indigenous people, guides, transporters, and 
industry. We realized that if we picked the representatives of the 
group, it would lose a lot of its credibility. Our hand-picked 
representatives would just be seen as people friendly to Fish and 
Game, which would undermine the group.37 
The group eventually decided to include twenty voting chairs 
representative of the public. It recognized that it could not give a 
seat at the table to every interest, so it began with the groups most 
directly dependent on the caribou and worked out from there. 
There were forty to fifty communities that depended upon caribou, 
so the Board adopted the advisory system developed by the State 
of Alaska many years before, as a model to structure native 
subsistence users’ representation.38 
During initial discussions on establishing some type of co-
management group, some Native Alaskan participants expressed 
their desire to have legal authority to promulgate regulations.39 
They wanted to be equal partners with the State of Alaska and 
federal agencies in managing the caribou herd. Agency officials 
responded that co-management was impossible, as there was no 
way that state or federal agencies could cede or share legal 
management authority with them or any other entity.40 Because of 
the inability for agencies to share authority, two leaders of the 
Alaskan Native community users dropped out of the group.41 
There was also internal resistance within the agency, as some 
employees feared that WACHWG could become too influential and 
undermine agency influence. Initially, some federal agencies were 
mildly supportive, but did not have time or money to participate 
fully in the 1990s.42 One interviewee remembers that a U.S. Fish and 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. MCMONAGLE, supra note 34. 
 40. Dau, supra note 28. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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Wildlife Service manager “came to every meeting [with the 
attitude] ‘We can’t do this. We can’t do this. There is no legal way 
to share authority. There is no way to do this.’”43 
Working slowly to build trust and overcome resistance, the 
WACHWG eventually made progress. Initially, agency organizers 
envisioned meetings as an opportunity to defend agency decision-
making. They imagined that agency biologists would educate 
indigenous hunters about herd conditions to create greater social 
acceptance when the tighter hunting restrictions were necessary. 
Over time, agency officials stopped talking and started 
listening. Hunters and Alaskan Native communities shared on-the-
ground observations and traditional ecological knowledge with 
biologists and agency officials.  
WACHWG created a subcommittee to draft a cooperative 
management plan, which was released in 2003 and continues to be 
periodically reviewed and updated.44 The plan envisions all 
stakeholders—including state, federal, corporate, and private 
landowners and resource managers—working together to carry out 
the group’s goals by developing cooperative agreements, sharing 
resources, and providing support in implementation.45 
Today, WACHWG is a collaboration between stakeholders 
interested in the long-term conservation of the Western Arctic 
Caribou Herd, the ecosystem upon which the herd is dependent, 
and the traditional and other uses thereof.46 Stakeholders include 
“subsistence users, other Alaskan hunters, reindeer herders, 
hunting guides, transporters, and conservationists” along with 
agency staff managers, natural resource managers, and biologists 
who act as consultants to the group—all of whom are 
knowledgeable about, interested in, and care for the management 
and conservation of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd.47 
The group holds a meeting once a year, allowing biologists to 
update stakeholders on the status of the health and population of 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21, at 1. 
 45. Id. at 6, 30. 
 46. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., Mission, https://westernarcticcaribou. 
net/mission/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 47. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., About, https://westernarcticcaribou. 
net/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
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the caribou, the range conditions, and other matters affecting the 
herd.48 Meetings focus on management and information transfer, 
with people talking about the issues they observe with respect to 
caribou. A typical meeting might include a specialist presenting 
information on the impact of climate, transportation, or public land 
use planning, or elders addressing the group drawing upon 
traditional ecological knowledge disseminated through the 
generations.49 There is a technical committee that meets a day prior 
to the meeting to discuss “nuts and bolts, biology and ecology,”50 
along with other subcommittees, which meet as needed throughout 
the year.51 
One founder notes that WACHWG has shifted away from the 
original conception of connecting field biologists with resource 
users and towards including agency staff members with little on-
the-ground experience: 
Now, there may be 75-100 agency staff at the annual meetings, 
some administrators and some biologists—none of whom more 
than occasionally do field work on this caribou herd. It has 
become a must-attend annual meeting populated mostly by 
agency staff who have little direct involvement working with this 
caribou herd, except for administrative stuff.52 
The informal tenor of early meetings became more structured over 
time: today there is a chair, co-chair, facilitator, and several note-
takers for each meeting.53 
Although WACHWG has over 100 people attending meetings, 
a National Park Service biologist believes that the “delicate balance 
between being unwieldy and everyone having a voice” is struck 
largely through having a facilitator and co-chairs who are adept at 
moving the ball forward.54 The location shifted from a rotating 
schedule of rural villages to Anchorage to limit the expenses of 
agency officials attending. WACHWG has collaborated with 
different federal agencies to implement a cooperative management 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Interview 1, supra note 30. 
 51. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., About, supra note 47. 
 52. Dau, supra note 28. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Interview 3 (on file with the author). 
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plan to effectuate cooperation among resource management 
agencies and all people who value and depend on the caribou.55 
4. Current conditions 
Today, WACHWG—and caribou at the center of it—are facing 
challenging times due to factors external to the group. Between 
2003 and 2011, the population of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd 
declined an average rate of 4–6% annually. As of 2011, the 
population of the herd numbered 325,000.56 The caribou were 
traditionally used primarily for subsistence, and today around 
10,000 to 15,000 caribou each year are killed for that purpose. 
Additionally, nonresidents and nonlocals kill approximately 500 to 
800 caribou each year in hunting expeditions.57 The New York Times 
recently reported that a controversial predator control regime 
implemented by the state—killing wolves, with the hope of 
increasing the number of caribou—had failed.58 
Additional concerns arise due to resource development and 
mining expansion westward from Prudhoe Bay into the National 
Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. Such continued expansion of mining 
would require cutting a transportation corridor through the herd’s 
range, which could affect the migration and distribution of the 
herd. Additionally, increased tourist aircraft overflight may stress 
the caribou before the winter months at a time when they should 
be gaining fat reserves.59 
Social, cultural, and traditional values are also at risk. Rural 
interior communities tend to be quite small and deeply rooted in 
traditional practices. Climate change effects and conflict over 
natural resources development are rapidly changing traditional 
ways of life.60 As elders die, traditional knowledge is lost.61 Rural 
communities are struggling to adapt to technological and social 
 
 55. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21, at 2. 
 56. Id. at 4–5. 
 57. Id. at 1. 
 58. Joanna Klein, Protected Wolves in Alaska Face Peril From Beyond Their Preserve, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jul. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/science/wolves-alaska-
yukon-charley-preserve.html. 
 59. W. ARCTIC CARIBOU HERD WORKING GRP., supra note 21, at 5. 
 60. OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL STRATEGY ON THE 
ARCTIC REGION (NSAR)—TEN YEAR RENEWABLE ENERGY STRATEGY 23 (2014) (“Concerns 
were expressed about melting permafrost leading to sinking villages and sea level rising.”). 
 61. Id. at 39. 
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change.62 There is no road access to many rural interior villages.63 
Residents and government officials must use airplanes, boats, snow 
machines, and sled dog teams to travel to more populated areas, 
which are hours away. Pilots must fly in the fuel to power these 
vital forms of transportation.64  
Food security remains a primary concern in rural Alaska.65 
Modern inhabitants of rural villages continue to live a subsistence 
lifestyle during times of food scarcity, depending upon hunted and 
harvested foods for the majority of their diet.66  
Against this mix of social, ecological, and economic challenges, 
the WACHWG provides a valuable management tool. According 
to interviews, village residents feel more positively about agency 
officials who participate in the group.67 The structural design that 
facilitated that trust, however, is imperfect. Because many group 
members have served for many years, there is infrequent  
turnover, which reduces the potential for information sharing 
through group members returning to their villages to share what 
they have learned. 
The group also comes at a professional cost to the biologists 
who participate because it lessens the time they can spend in the 
field. WACHWG founder Jim Dau notes, “We invested tremendous 
time and energy to initially establish and later support this group, 
and we paid dearly in terms of internal political capital.”68 
Nevertheless, the two-decades-long collaboration has built 
relationships among previous adversaries and developed long-
absent trust between Alaskan Native communities and agency 
officials. Decades of relationship-building provide a solid 
 
 62. Id. at 41. 
 63. Interties, roads, and basic infrastructure in villages are ongoing, critical needs in 
the region. 
 64. Id. at 17 (“Another concern was the shallowing of the upper Kobuk rivers, which 
requires fuel to be flown in.”). 
 65. Several quotations are drawn from words spoken directly by members of Alaskan 
Native communities. In 2014, The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Indian Energy held 
a series of seven tribal consultation sessions in various Alaskan cities. Notably, these were 
more populous places, not the smallest villages, although some sent representations to the 
sessions. Between two and twenty-two people attended each meeting. Minutes of what 
residents said in the meeting highlights some of the concerns. Id. at 2–3. 
 66. Id. at 37. 
 67. Dau, supra note 28. 
 68. Id. 
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foundation for decision-making to meet the current risks to the 
herd and indigenous residents to rural Alaska.  
B. Agencies’ Use of Collaborative Analysis 
To manage caribou, WACHWG used a broad group of 
stakeholders to fashion an ongoing solution through collaborative 
analysis. Indeed, collaborative analysis—the focus of this Article—
stems from these stakeholder collaborations.69 But the working 
group in Alaska is not alone in employing this analytical approach. 
There are hundreds of stakeholder collaborations governing the 
land and natural resources in the United States. 70  
Through collaborations, however, stakeholders and agencies 
try to avoid litigation and gridlock. Stakeholders commit to 
creating mutually agreeable recommendations to the agency on 
how best to manage risk. They hash out disagreements, negotiate, 
and ultimately compromise. One court noted that “[p]ublic 
participation is, by nature, messy.”71 It is a time-consuming, inexact 
process filled with ups and downs. The group issues 
recommendations and feedback to the agency on an ongoing basis, 
which allows the agency to assess prior decisions and update 
assessments in light of changing conditions.72 
 
 69. Stakeholder collaborations are “a group of people with strong interests in, yet 
differing views on, the proper management of a particular, localized group of lands or 
resources, committed in writing to working together to create mutually agreeable 
recommendations for managing the resource across changing conditions on an ongoing 
basis.” Karen Bradshaw, Agency Engagement with Stakeholder Collaborations, in Wildfire Policy 
and Beyond, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 437, 445 (2019). 
 70. As an Academic Consultant for ACUS in 2017, I led a team of research assistants 
for three months in meeting with agency employees, touring public lands, and conducting 
dozens of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and agency officials. We surveyed 
statutes, executive orders, and regulations to assess how many collaborations existed. To 
gain a real world perspective on the uses and limitations of democratic risk management, I 
traveled to Alaska to observe how agency officials manage to incorporate social and moral 
inputs into risk management decisions. The project culminated in an ACUS Office of the 
Chairman report, Stakeholder Collaborations for Managing Land and Natural Resources. See  
BRADSHAW, supra note 8. That report and a subsequent law journal article overviewed what 
collaborations are, who uses them, and in which contexts. Id. (analyzing stakeholder 
collaborations through a survey of laws and regulations requiring collaboration, review of 
primary documents, and qualitative data gathered through interviews and attendance at 
agency meetings); Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 456. 
 71. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1313 (D. Idaho 2008). 
 72. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8. 
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Collaborations do not produce clear winners and losers. 
Stakeholders generally end up with better outcomes than if they 
had not participated, but not their ideal outcome.73 Through such 
processes of negotiation, decisions shift from Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency (the group is overall better off than the status quo)74 to 
Pareto superior outcomes (some people are better off relative to the 
status quo and no one is worse off).75 The group voluntarily 
smooths the distributional effects of decisions by re-allocating the 
benefits and harms. For example, a wildlife advocacy organization 
may agree to compensate ranchers whose livestock are killed by 
wolves reintroduced to an area, even though the agency managing 
wolves has no legal obligation to compensate ranchers.76 
Stakeholder collaborations provide a standing, readily 
available cross-section of key constituencies to assess and manage 
new and emerging challenges. They also serve to generate bottom-
up or crowdsourced information about risk, which may include 
information absent from the analytic-data approach.77 Temporally, 
collaborative decision-making sometimes collapses the assessment 
and management phases of risk assessment, removing an arbitrary 
distinction that need not exist. Collaborations’ ongoing, iterative 
nature differentiates them from other forms of public-private 
cooperation, such as linear notice-and-comment periods or 
negotiated rulemaking. There is no endpoint to stakeholder 
collaborations—no moment at which the stakeholders must decide 
on a final policy decision. The focus, objective, and composition of 
the group may shift dramatically over time.78 
 
 73. SHANNON K. ORR, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING AND STAKEHOLDER 
COLLABORATION  54 (2013). 
 74. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 21–22 (2006). 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. ORR, supra note 73, at 136–39. 
 77. See infra Section II.B. 
 78. Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level 
Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2542–43 (2015) (describing  how the Malpai Borderlands 
cattle ranching community leverages preexisting relationships formed around grazing 
practices to manage wildfire risk). 
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Many agencies rely heavily on stakeholder collaborations to 
inform risk management policy.79 They credit collaboration with 
producing substantively better decisions informed by different 
perspectives and a broader information base.80 Instead of agency 
officials making value judgments and guesses as to distributional 
consequences, they float potential policies past the clearly 
identifiable stakeholders who would feel their serious, localized 
effects.81 Early and meaningful public engagement leads to greater 
social acceptance of decision-making, and potentially less 
litigation.82 Agency employees describe working with stakeholder 
collaborations as “vital” and note that “we couldn’t do our jobs 
without it.”83 
Agencies have long operated amidst deep uncertainty. Over 
time, they have learned how to make controversial, high-stake 
decisions that will prove politically and socially acceptable.  
For instance, agencies use a variety of collaborative governance 
tools (e.g., regional bodies, listening sessions, notice-and-comment 
periods, and informal relationships) that involve some degree  
of collaboration.84 Agencies frequently use stakeholder 
collaborations—coordinating early and often with the private 
groups that will most bear the costs or benefits of agency 
decisions—to inform policymaking in conditions of frequent 
change, localized high stakes, and deep uncertainty.85 Although 
 
 79. Although ubiquitous in practice, discussion of collaborative analysis as an 
alternative to top-down approaches is virtually absent from legal scholarship on risk 
management. For a discussion of related literatures, see infra Section II.B. Existing risk 
management theory posits that agencies use scientific data to set standards, then employs 
cost-benefit analysis to assess various policy tools to achieve the standard. This account is 
correct but incomplete—it overlooks the vital step of qualitative inputs into the 
policymaking practice. 
 80. See infra Section II.B. 
 81. See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 82. Department Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing 
Administration—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9924 (Feb. 22, 1995) (“Experience 
has shown that the greater and more meaningful the participation during the formulation of 
decisions and strategies for management, the higher the level of acceptance and thus the 
lower the likelihood of a protest, an appeal, or some other form of contest”); see also infra 
Section III.C; . 
 83.  Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 442 n.13. 
 84. For a typology of collaborative techniques, and their features, used in land and 
resource management, see BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 15 fig.1. 
 85. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 121, 143-45, 156-57  (2016); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 376-79 (2004). 
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many scholars are doing the important work of documenting 
agencies’ use of these tools, they have been slow to situate  
them next to cost-benefit analysis in the pantheon of decision-
making tools. 
Collaborative analysis is especially relevant for high-stakes 
decisions for a small and localized population (i.e., management of 
specific public lands or policing practices). It is less sensible either 
in circumstances with uniform, diffuse effects without localized 
expertise (i.e., vaccine recommendations) or in circumstances with 
a need for centralized, top-down, unilateral control (i.e., military 
action). Agencies widely studied by administrative law scholars, 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency and Office of 
Workplace Health and Safety, tend to use cost-benefit analysis 
because the scale of policy decisions tracks guidelines for using 
cost-benefit analysis. Agencies controlling physical resources with 
a set geographic position tend to use collaborative analysis. These 
include the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, 
and Forest Service. Under a collaborative analysis approach, the 
agency is constantly assessing and managing risk in consultation 
with stakeholders. This real-time feedback mechanism creates 
adaptiveness and partnerships unavailable through cost-benefit 
analysis alone. 
To provide an example of how response can occur prior to 
assessment, consider oil spills. Potentially responsible parties (who 
spilled the oil) provide funding for natural resources trustees 
(tribes, federal agencies, and states) to initiate clean up and 
recovery efforts immediately. All parties benefit from early 
response, rather than waiting the many years necessary to provide 
a cost assessment of risks. But this option is only available when 
potentially responsible parties and trustees agree to work jointly on 
recovery—a collaborative analysis technique. 86 
Agencies’ need to incorporate stakeholder input into policy 
analysis is important for sizeable risks, which risks will be 
internalized by concentrated, identifiable groups.87 Stakeholder 
 
 86. Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
211 (2016). 
 87. Stakeholders are unlikely to engage in collaborations for low-stakes outcomes; 
similarly agencies (and even the President) may be loath to share decision-making for  
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input can increase agencies’ understanding of how citizens value 
various criteria, broaden the perspectives brought to bear on an 
issue. Collaborative processes can also generate better data, 
increase social acceptance of decisions, overcome group 
polarization, facilitate resource pooling, and allow for  
continuously updating policy.88 Core principles from disparate 
academic literatures foreshadow collaborative analysis by 
demonstrating that collaborative approaches have potential to 
produce more efficient, just, and cost-effective policymaking. My 
research indicates that collaborative analysis enables agencies to 
leverage the knowledge and capabilities of stakeholders, engage in 
iterative analysis, and pre-test the social acceptability of decisions 
prior to implementation.89 
Collaborative analysis intersects with cost-benefit analysis in 
context-specific ways: sometimes the tools act in tandem, 
sometimes one substitutes for the other.90 
Although various models of collaborative analysis exist, the 
most visible form is of a stakeholder collaboration consulting with 
an agency on the decision-making. A stakeholder collaboration is a 
group of people with strong interests in, yet differing views on, an 
important issue. For example, stakeholder collaborations can form 
around the management of a localized group of lands or resources, 
between members who are formally committed to working 
together to create mutually agreeable recommendations for 
managing the resource across changing conditions.91 Landowners, 
industrial land users, nongovernmental organizations, state and 
tribal neighbors, hunters, conservationists, and others form 
collaborations as a structural vehicle for coming together to discuss 
issues related to specific lands or resources.92 
In such groups, a strong interest in the outcome of the decision 
unifies differing parties—essentially, the parties involved in the 
collaboration are those who will bear the detriments of 
mismanaged risk. Stakeholder collaborations develop rules and 
 
very high-stakes outcomes. Thus, collaborative analysis likely operates best in between  
these extremes. 
 88. See infra Section II.B. 
 89. Bradshaw, supra note 69. 
 90. See infra notes 98–103. 
 91. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 10. 
 92. Id. at 3. 
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norms for internal governance, such as organizing monthly 
meetings and determining rules for dispute resolution. Over time, 
the collaboration identifies specific areas of concern, shares 
perspectives, considers data, creates reports, and hashes out 
recommendations on how the relevant management agency should 
approach a problem. 
Agencies work closely with collaborations but are not 
themselves members of the collaboration.93 Instead, agencies play a 
supportive role, such as by initiating the formation of a 
collaboration, providing meeting space, carrying out studies, 
assigning personnel to act as liaisons between the collaboration and 
agency, sharing information, and generating funding.94 
Importantly, agencies can provide stakeholders with data and 
information on how to assess it. Decision-making under this model 
is an iterative process, unfolding over decades in response to ever-
changing natural conditions. Stakeholder collaborations often work 
with agencies to achieve multiple objectives and, throughout it all, 
strive to build trust and maintain positive, working relationships. 
Agencies also informally share a portion of their decision-
making authority with collaborations when they engage 
stakeholders in meetings and working groups to reach mutually 
agreeable decisions. The agency is legally required, however, to 
retain sole decision-making authority, even when making decisions 
in consultation with collaborative groups.95 
II. COMPARING COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS WITH COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 
This Part compares and contrasts collaborative analysis 
with cost-benefit analysis (as the most familiar placeholder for the 
 
 93. One agency respondent raised the important point that this definition excludes 
forms of collaboration such as regional planning bodies, in which various government 
entities collaborate to explore options and share information. Although such a body would 
be outside the definition of stakeholder collaborations as defined in this article since it 
includes on government stakeholders, inter-government collaborations undoubtedly exist 
among federal, tribal, state, and local governments, and play an important role in managing 
a variety of resources. 
 94. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 4. 
 95. For a discussion of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and other rules limiting 
the extent to which agencies can defer to external groups, see infra notes 160–162 and 
accompanying text 
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broader category of numerical decision-making tools). I outline the 
benefits of collaborative analysis (Section II.A.) and arguments 
against it (Section II.B).  
A. The Benefits of Collaborative Analysis 
1. Incorporating moral inputs 
For sixty years, law and economics scholars have struggled to 
respond to critiques that cost-benefit analysis alone, without social 
or moral context, can lead to perverse outcomes.96 Many focus on 
empirical data: better evaluations, more convincing numbers, 
weighting factors to reflect moral judgments.97  
Traditional accounts of cost-benefit analysis include a variety of 
tools to capture people’s values, such as “willingness to pay.”98 
Collaborative analysis hands the problem to be managed over to 
the people most affected by it. It allows that group to hash out a 
mutually acceptable policy, which implicitly represents the 
aggregate of their collective preferences weighted to reflect the 
relative strength of the individuals within the group. Collaborative 
analysis can serve as either a stand-in for cost-benefit analysis, or a 
complement to it. 
In practice, agencies must incorporate distributional concerns 
into policymaking.99 Widespread attention to distributional 
weighting as the mechanism through which this can occur fails to 
consider the viability of alternative and complementary tools for 
incorporating such concerns into decision-making. Indeed, 
 
 96. See also Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was 
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN L. REV. 155, 157 (2005) (describing that 
blind application of cost-benefit analysis could lead to questionable decisions). For example, 
a strict cost-benefit analysis might encourage people to smoke so they would live less long 
and thus require fewer healthcare expenditures. 
 97. Distributional weighting involves assigning various values into cost-benefit 
analysis to reduce income effects, effectively lessening inequality and wealth considerations. 
See David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit analysis: Welfare Economics Meets 
Organizational Design, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 151–52 (2015) (overviewing the key 
arguments in the lively debate about distributional weighting); see also infra Section II.C. 
 98. “Willingness to pay” describes economists asking people what they are willing to 
pay for various goods, then using the input to calculate the compensating variation, or the 
amount that the individuals would be willing to pay to start or stop the project. Matthew 
Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1998). 
 99. A variety of laws, executive orders, and regulations require agencies to incorporate 
distributional concerns through qualitative input. See infra Part III. 
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collaborative analysis captures the distributional and value 
questions that economists have struggled to incorporate into a cost-
benefit analysis. Agencies may be using collaborative analysis 
instead of top-down policymaking in situations where 
distributional questions should drive policy outcomes, suggesting 
that distributional weighting within cost-benefit analysis may be 
relatively unimportant if agencies switch to an alternative tool 
when policy requires distributional assessments that drive choices. 
There are many reasons to think that direct qualitative input by 
stakeholders might better reflect their actual preferences than 
attempts to quantify their thoughts through contingent valuation 
or other data-driven tools. Some people respond hostilely to 
questions posed by economists with clipboards standing in front of 
supermarkets, refusing to answer the question or offering 
extraordinary high or low values.100 Survey techniques place even 
willing participants in an artificial situation, likely thinking of their 
drive home or dinner plans and not having an opportunity to 
meaningfully consider information about the questions posted for 
a meaningful period. Moreover, surveying creates isolation, 
focusing only on the individual being asked the question. People 
learn about their own values through interaction; the group 
dynamics of collaborative analysis allow individuals to refine and 
improve their assessments in relation to the perspectives of others. 
Making real-world tradeoffs within social, ecological, and 
economic realities removes the artificiality of contingent valuation 
and other survey methodologies.101 I cannot tell you with certainty 
whether I value Mt. Shasta at $100 million or $1 billion or $100 
billion. But I could certainly make choices about what I would be 
willing to trade to prevent strip mining the dramatic mountain. 
Would I trade the total national gross domestic product? No. Some 
missed opportunities for growth within the relatively 
impoverished local economy? Certainly. Within this spectrum of 
these extremes, I could make refined and detailed judgments, 
particularly if allowed to consider the issue for an extended time  
 
 100. ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE 
PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 30–8 (1989). 
 101. “In day-to-day life, we routinely make judgments of overall well-being, comparing 
losses to some of our friends, colleagues or family members with gains to others.” ADLER & 
POSNER, supra 74, at 41. 
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in collaboration with other committed stakeholders. As a result, the 
real-world nature of making tradeoffs that reflect my internal 
values is almost certainly more accurate than attempting to  
assign dollar values to things that the average person does not 
consider quantifiable. 
For these reasons, collaborative analysis can serve as a formal 
or informal complement to cost-benefit analysis.102 One could 
imagine agencies using stakeholder groups to weigh various kinds 
of data, then input stakeholder weighting into the cost-benefit 
analysis. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner describe the potential for 
agencies to “launder” public preferences, removing heuristic biases 
and idiosyncratic or antisocial inputs.103 Although Adler and 
Posner consider agency officials themselves performing this 
function, under the collaborative analysis models, agencies task 
stakeholder groups with sorting through various preferences. 
2. Facilitating Pareto superior outcomes  
Collaborative analysis can shift policy outcomes from satisfying 
Kaldor-Hicks criteria (the net welfare is higher) to Pareto  
superior decisions (all parties are at least equally well off) by 
prompting trades among potential winners and losers. Stakeholder 
groups provide a government-sponsored forum for distributional 
negotiations, which top-down decision-making cannot achieve  
in isolation. 
Consider the difference between top-down and democratic 
policymaking for a decision between logging a public forest or 
conserving it for wildlife preservation. Under a top-down model, 
the agency might conduct a cost-benefit analysis. If logging 
produced a gain bigger than the costs associated with losing 
wildlife habitat, the decision would satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks 
criteria, and the agency would permit the logging operation. 
Under a collaborative analysis model, a stakeholder group 
comprising both the timber company and the environmental 
nongovernmental organization would vote on a recommendation 
of whether to log or not. To secure the vote of the environmental 
NGO, the timber company might agree to place a conservation 
 
 102. See id. at 73–79. 
 103. Id. at 129–49. 
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easement on private land to provide wildlife habitat in perpetuity. 
If the NGO found this a satisfactory deal, they would vote yes. The 
stakeholder group would issue a recommendation that the Forest 
Service approve the logging operation, and it would approve the 
project. Through the democratic process, the parties will negotiate 
until they reach a Pareto superior outcome, in which both parties 
are better off than the status quo. 
The imprimatur of a government-sponsored forum allows 
polarized parties to retain integrity in the eyes of their 
constituencies while nevertheless making tradeoffs. Stakeholders 
can credibly report to their constituencies that the cost of not 
participating in a collaboration is greater than what they might 
concede to reach agreement. The threat of unfavorable agency 
action absent an agreement drives all parties towards increased 
openness to negotiation, relative to direct bargaining. Moreover, 
collaboration integrates agency decision-makers into the policy 
process, and thus they are more likely to accept the stakeholder 
recommendation, relative to parties saying “we have reached a 
bargain for you to approve” without agency input. In sum, 
collaborative analysis opens the door to direct negotiation for 
redistribution of benefits to secure policy approvals. 
3. Inclusiveness of diverse perspectives and talents 
Cost-benefit analysis uses a language (math) in which relatively 
few Americans are fluent. This unintentionally serves to shuts out 
all but the highly educated from policy spaces. Scholars who 
conflate “sound” decision-making with numerical analysis 
discount vast swaths of the human potential. Valuable alternative 
data exist. Dogged insistence on numerical analysis as the gold 
standard for agency and judicial decision-making threatens to 
narrow the array of human potential to a small subset of skills. 
Tapping into these diverse sources of information by engaging non-
agency actors through the process of democratic risk management 
broadens the pool of information to inform policy choices. 
Diversity advocates often frame arguments in terms of fairer, 
more just policy and the related goal of democratic legitimacy. 
Here, I advance a related but distinct basis for a diversity of inputs 
into agency decision-making: that incorporating diverse 
perspectives in agency decision-making can make substantively 
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better policy by introducing a broader base of information on which 
to base a decision. 
Useful talents are distributed inequitably across the population. 
So too is genius. Thus, over-emphasizing a category of people in 
government fails to capture the collective potential of a population. 
Leveraging the collective skills and strengths dispersed throughout 
society opens the door to more information and better decisions.104 
Recognizing the diffusion of skill may also serve to increase social 
cooperation and a more democratic government by acknowledging 
that different people bring different traits to the table, the sum of 
which is greater than its parts. No one country, social group, or 
segment of society has a monopoly on all the relevant, necessary 
knowledge in the world  
It is easy for those resistant to this argument to jump to logical 
extremes, suggesting, for example, the influence of a single 
idiosyncratic person or group with questionable “data.” Although 
such defensiveness is understandable, it can also be 
counterproductive to achieving desired outcomes. Law has long 
incorporated roles for nonacademic data to inform policy. And it 
should. Here, I take the argument a step farther and explore how 
law institutionalizes the input of nonacademic data into regulatory 
decisions. As outlined below, the formalized incorporation of data 
varies wildly according to its source. 
Risk perception literature within social psychology finds  
that groups of stakeholders informed by risk experts can generate 
the best-available decisions.105 Robin S. Gregory has  
conducted decades of experiments on how stakeholder 
involvement can influence agency decision-making.106 Gregory’s 
 
 104. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1103 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)). See, e.g., R. GREGORY ET AL., STRUCTURED DECISION 
MAKING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CHOICES (2012) 
[hereinafter STRUCTURED DECISION MAKING]; Robin S. Gregory & Ralph L. Keeny, Making 
Smarter Environmental Management Decisions, 38 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 1601 (2002) 
[hereinafter Environmental Management Decisions]; Robin S. Gregory, The Troubling Logic of 
Inclusivity in Environmental Consultations, 42 SCI., TECH,. & HUM. VALUES 144 (2017) 
[hereinafter The Troubling Logic]. 
 105. Kahan et al., supra note 104. 
 106. See, e.g., STRUCTURED DECISION MAKING, supra note 104; Environmental Management 
Decisions, supra note 104. A robust social science on risk perception studies the way that 
people assess risk. Kahan et al., supra note 104. 
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work on “‘science-based, community-supported’ environmental 
risk policies . . . presents empirical evidence showing that this 
approach generates outcomes that are more consensual and more 
defensible from a scientific standpoint than either unguided 
bottom-up approaches to regulations or highly centralized and 
insulated top-down ones.”107 Similarly, Dan Kahan has pushed 
back against the anti-populist elements of Sunstein’s approach by 
suggesting that different world views may not reflect heuristic 
error so much as value differences.108 
Agency employees tend to share ideological commitments, 
which may differ from those of the broader public. Introducing 
external perspectives increases agency cognition of outside views, 
which can broaden agency approaches.109 Stakeholder 
collaborations generate different management ideas than the 
agency would if acting alone. Competing ideas may lead to extra 
vetting, resulting in better decisions. 
A member of a stakeholder collaboration described the group’s 
influence on the Forest Service’s approach to the NEPA process: 
[T]hey have certain criteria for data, that might not be the most 
recently available data, but at that agency because of their 
litigation, they are more comfortable with certain kinds of data 
that they feel has defended protective actions more. I think that is 
where the conflict comes. The stakeholders would like to be 
innovative and use best available science. The Forest Service 
Agency has reluctance to switch data midstream because it hasn’t 
been proven in court and might be more vulnerable. We would 
argue that using best available science would do better in court.110 
 
 107. Kahan et al., supra note 104 (citing Robin Gregory & Katherine Wellman, Bringing 
Stakeholder Values into Environmental Policy Choices: A Community-Based Estuary Case Study, 39 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 37–38 (2001)). Interestingly, Gregory has recently suggested that  
too much unfiltered stakeholder input can also be counterproductive—a reminder  
that collaborative analysis is not a panacea against poor decisions. The Troubling Logic, supra 
note 104. 
 108. Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1072 (describing a theory of cultural cognition, 
which suggests that individuals conform their beliefs about risk to their visions of an  
ideal society). 
 109. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 87 (1992) (noting that “cooperative open communication may 
produce more efficient regulatory outcomes because bad arguments and bad solutions are 
less likely to go unchallenged”). 
 110.  Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 479. 
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This example illustrates a collaboration pushing an agency towards 
what may, in fact, be an objectively better decision—using the best 
available science, instead of the more defensive position (i.e., what 
a court has previously accepted). Ultimately, the collaboration 
pushed the agency to adopt better quantitative analysis techniques. 
Agencies’ willingness to share decision-making builds 
relationships and improves the agencies’ reputations, which is 
useful for managing other agency affairs. 
4. Generating better data 
Stakeholder input increases the likelihood of generating 
valuable information that might otherwise be unavailable to 
agencies, which often rely solely on scientifically generated data.111 
Alternative data may include the observations of on-the-ground 
users of a resource that possess a degree of specialization that 
outsiders cannot replicate. Consider a few examples: An 
experienced factory worker could discern how well a machine she 
maintains is operating by the humming sound it makes.112 Sailors 
in the Marshall Island maintained a sophisticated tidal map in their 
minds that allowed them to navigate great distances without 
Western navigation tools, a feat so complicated that scientists had 
to see it to believe it.113 Villagers in Aneyoshi, Japan, escaped a 
tsunami by heeding century-old carved stone tablets that warned 
future generations to escape to higher ground when waves reached 
a certain level.114 
These examples illustrate insights can produce information that 
would be valuable in assessing risk of machine failure, safe sailing 
conditions, and tsunami evacuation planning. Failure to 
incorporate institutional or traditional knowledge by these 
stakeholders would lead to suboptimal decision-making. 
 
 111. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 174 (2014) 
(noting the value of private entities providing information unavailable to agencies acting  
in isolation). 
 112. Michael Barbaro, Listen to ‘The Daily’: Disappearing Factory Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/podcasts/the-daily/factory-jobs.html. 
 113. Kim Tingley, The Secrets of the Wave Pilots, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/magazine/the-secrets-of-the-wave-pilots.html. 
 114. Danny Lewis, These Century-Old Stone “Tsunami Stones” Dot Japan’s Coastline, 
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/ 
century-old-warnings-against-tsunamis-dot-japans-coastline-180956448/. 
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Collaborative analysis provides a forum for agencies to receive and 
incorporate such pluralistic forms of information. 
Various academic literatures provide examples of alternative 
data that adds real value to risk management and policymaking. 
The Nobel Prize-winning work of Elinor Ostrom observed that 
bottom-up rules developed by non-expert resource users 
outperformed top-down policies informed by scientific 
information in many natural resource contexts.115 The related social 
ecological systems theory suggests that ecosystems, local knowledge, 
people, and property rights institutions are inexorably linked—
suggesting that risk approaches failing to incorporate these 
elements are foregoing valuable information.116 
Similarly, firms operating within an industry tend to have 
superior information about that industry, relative to regulators.117 
Jody Freeman has shown how regulators collaborate with 
regulated entities through negotiated rulemaking.118 Similarly, a 
robust literature on public-private partnership and new governance 
documents agencies’ willingness to partner with regulated entities, 
and the benefits of doing so.119 
Social justice scholars suggest that empowering diverse peoples 
in decision-making produces policy that is more just and fair. 
Traditional ecological knowledge—intergenerational information 
about the natural environment contained in the oral history of 
indigenous peoples—is increasingly recognized as a legally valid 
 
 115. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). This influential finding has led subsequent 
scholars to conduct thousands of case studies examining user-created rules to manage risks 
ranging from poaching to deforestation. See generally CPR & SES Databases, INDIANA 
UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON: OSTROM WORKSHOP, https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/ 
resources/library/cpr-ses-databases.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 116. FIKRET BERKES & CARL FOLKE, LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE 2 (1998). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See JODY FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOW, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the 
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000). 
 119. See, e.g., Orley Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New 
Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515, 2515 (2013). 
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decision-making tool.120 Mary Becker’s theory of relational feminism 
suggests that culture overvalues masculine qualities and 
undervalues female qualities, such as community and 
relationships.121 Similarly, ecofeminism suggests that environmental 
policy can only be adequately addressed through increased 
inclusion of intersectional, traditionally oppressed voices.122 
Inclusion of less-represented groups may prove more efficient too: 
recent studies suggest that the impoverished are best-positioned to 
assess the effectiveness of funds deployed to alleviate poverty.123 
Tapping into these diverse sources of information by engaging 
non-agency actors through the process of collaborative analysis 
broadens the pool of information to inform policy choices. 
Stakeholder groups provide a structured, ongoing, and transparent 
form of information gathering. They also provide insight into how 
to frame policies in a manner that will appeal to as many 
constituencies as possible. 
5. Increasing social acceptance 
Agency officials believe that decisions they make through 
collaborative processes benefit from greater social acceptance.124 
Collaborations generally form around controversial issues with 
deeply entrenched interest groups. Within this adversarial context, 
decisions informed by collaboration may prove more socially 
acceptable than those made by agency officials acting alone. 
Through collaboration, stakeholders negotiate compromises 
themselves, instead of merely receiving and judging agency 
 
 120. Katie O’Bryan, The Appropriation of Indigenous Ecological Knowledge: Recent 
Australian Developments, 1 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 29, 44-45 (2004). Some 
commentators view traditional ecological knowledge as valuable in bolstering community 
resilience to climate change. Erik Gómez-Baggethun et al., Traditional Ecological Knowledge 
and Global Environmental Change: Research Findings and Policy Implications, 18 ECOLOGY & 
SOC’Y 72 (2013). 
 121. Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 21, 47–49 (1999). 
 122. Greta Gaard & Lori Gruen, Ecofeminism: Toward Global Justice and Planetary Health, 
2 SOC’Y & NATURE 1 (1993); VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 44-46 (1988). 
 123. Johannes Haushofer & Jeremy Shapiro, The Short-term Impact of Unconditional Cash 
Transfers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya, 131 Q. J. ECON. 1973 (2016). 
 124. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 479–80; AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109, at 87–
88 (“Conditions of trust and cooperation increase the prospects that the parties will end up 
with a commitment to making the agreed solution work”). 
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decisions. In this sense, an agency official described collaborations 
as “do[ing] our work for us” by building social consensus around 
controversial decisions.125 
On a related point, agencies believe they are less likely to be 
sued, or to lose a lawsuit, for a decision that accords with a set of 
recommendations from a stakeholder collaboration. One official 
noted: “Collaboration is not the panacea for getting rid of lawsuits. 
But it sure as hell makes [that risk] a lot lower.”126 Lessened 
litigation risk is partially explainable by the positive relationships 
that emerge in groups, and the expectation that the group—and 
relationships between its members—will persist in the future. Also, 
entrenched interests necessarily accept up-front that compromise  
is the expected outcome of collaboration. Potential litigants may 
believe that their negotiated decisions are less risky than what  
a court might provide, a calculus like that which occurs  
in settlements. 
Finally, constituencies may bristle at top-down government 
decisions for a variety of reasons. An official reported: “I don’t 
think anybody can do anything on their own anymore and be 
legitimate.”127 This point is consistent with the theory of 
deliberative democracy—the idea that citizens and government 
representatives alike should give reasons for the decisions that they 
reach, using some mix of procedural and substantive information 
to justify policies.128 Collaboration on sensitive decisions appears to 
have become the new norm. 
6. Overcoming group polarization 
The possibility-opening nature of collaborative analysis may 
overcome some of the very biases that behavioral economists use 
to justify top-down policy solutions.129 Behavioral economists 
observe that group polarization is a virtually inevitable function of 
belonging to a group.130 Creating a new stakeholder group may 
 
 125. Interview 4 (on file with author). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004). 
 129. See infra Section II.B. 
 130. Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1085; Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 
10 J. POL. PHIL. 175 (2002). 
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avoid this outcome by providing an opportunity for people with 
entrenched viewpoints to form a new identity as a member of a 
collaborative group committed to compromise. Social scientists 
have predicted this result, noting: 
[C]ultural affinity is the dominant in-group when individuals 
appraise risk. But as they engage one another in earnest face-to-
face deliberation, individuals committed to resolving an 
important common problem typically form strong emotional 
bonds. It’s plausible to imagine that these connections generate  
a group identity that, for the period of deliberation at  
least, displaces cultural affiliations as individuals’ dominant 
reference point.131 
Precisely such a dynamic appears to have occurred within the 
successful collaborations that I studied.132 Relationships defined by 
deep-seated distrust transformed through ongoing participation  
in the group. Although previous opponents are not aligned,  
strong relationships have emerged, which serve to humanize 
opposing perspectives. Moreover, the creation of a shared group 
seemingly lessened the need for participants to cling to their 
positions. It became socially acceptable to compromise and see 
differing perspectives. 
Of course, the mere creation of relationships in well-functioning 
groups does not indicate that all groups will be successful. Agency 
officials provided examples of decades-long collaborations  
marked by entrenched positions and in-fighting with few  
tangible successes.133 The key trademarks of unsuccessful groups 
included: personality conflicts, distrust, and an unwillingness  
to compromise. 
Trust is the well-acknowledged linchpin of successful 
groups.134 But how does it emerge? Three factors repeatedly came 
up in interviews with agency officials that seem particularly likely 
 
 131. Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1101–02. 
 132. See Bradshaw, supra note 70; infra Part I. 
 133. Although the agency officials declined to permit the details of these failures to be 
published, it is important to note that failures exist, if only to flag the need for further study 
of what breeds, or prevents, group polarization. 
 134. For a discussion on the role of trust in collaborative regulatory decision-making, 
see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109, at 84–86; Keith G. Provan & Patrick Kenis, Modes 
of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 229, 237–38 (2007). 
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to indicate success. First, several groups attribute their success  
to professional facilitation by a skilled expert in group dynamics.135 
Similarly, some agencies have dedicated experts in  
stakeholder collaborations available to agency staff engaging in 
collaborative analysis.136 
Second, some groups have preexisting shared social norms 
among group members or agency members, based upon kinship 
relationships, geographic proximity, or prior cooperative 
endeavors.137 Note that lower-level state (not federal) officials 
formed the WACHWG. The social relationships between these 
rural state government officials and the key stakeholders led to a 
more inclusive and collaborative approach than approaches 
created by top state and federal officials. Shared norms may 
provide preexisting understandings of acceptable behavior and 
dispute resolution, as well as deepen the parties’ investment in the 
success of the group, with anticipated spillover effects into other 
aspects of their relationships.138 
Third, I suspect that relational contracting is playing an unsung 
role in trust-building. Creating early-stage internal rules, group 
charters, and memoranda of understanding with the agencies may 
satisfy the scaffolding functions that are known to build trust 
among commercial contracting parties.139 
For example, the WACHWG organizers focused on addressing 
small issues at first to build trust, rather than risk fracturing the 
budding group by taking on sensitive issues initially. For the first 
five years, the WACHWG avoided addressing herd management 
issues altogether to avoid “rocking the boat.”140 Instead, the focus 
was on facilitating an environment in which the group could build 
 
 135. Bradshaw, supra note 8, at 51–52. 
 136. Id. at 25. 
 137. Schulz & Lueck, supra note 78, at 2542 (describing how the Malpai Borderlands 
cattle ranching community successfully leverages preexisting relationships to manage 
wildfire risk). Several founding members of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working 
Group had familial relationships with members of Alaskan Native communities, which 
facilitated trust that would likely have been otherwise unavailable to agency officials. 
 138. This is my generalized observation resulting from dozens of interviews in various 
settings and cultural contexts; it is not a sentiment stated by a particular interview subject. 
 139. Karen Bradshaw, Agency Coordination of Private Action: The Role of Relational 
Contracting, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 229, 229 (2018) (symposium article discussing the role of 
relational contracting in public-private collaborations). 
 140. Dau interview, supra note 28. 
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trust and find a “grudging” consensus over time. The caribou herd 
was large and growing during this period, so there was no real 
controversial management issue requiring WACHWG’s attention. 
Although anecdotal, the factors of external involvement,  
shared norms, and relational contracting appear to be some factors 
that may increase chances of trust—and thus success—among 
group members. 
7. Enabling resource pooling 
Stakeholders in collaborations use their relative strengths to 
advance shared objectives. Agencies and stakeholders are both 
confined in what they can do. By pooling capacities, the group can 
jointly achieve more than any individual stakeholder could achieve 
alone. Collaborative analysis allows for public-private pooling 
analogous to agencies pooling with other agencies within the 
executive branch.141 For example, stakeholders cannot directly 
manage public lands, and agencies cannot lobby Congress. Yet, 
working collectively, stakeholders and agencies can develop 
common goals, then deploy their relative strengths to advance the 
objectives.142 For stakeholders in collaborations, these strengths 
often include financial resources, human resources, and the 
capacity to lobby. 
This synergistic relationship displaces the traditional notion of 
agency and non-agency actors acting under the principal-agent 
model, in which agencies are essentially controlling external 
parties.143 Instead, agencies both support—and are supported by— 
stakeholders; agencies influence stakeholder groups and 
stakeholder groups influence agencies. Ultimately, agency and 
non-agency actors with different capacities and constraints use 
collaborations as a starting point to pool resources to advance 
shared objectives. The extent of this pooling may, however, raise 
questions about the distinctions between public and private 
 
 141. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 211 (2015) (describing 
agency to agency pooling). 
 142. Bradshaw, supra note 139. 
 143. Hannah Wiseman has observed elsewhere in the administrative state that the 
relationships now seem bi-directional. Hannah J. Wiseman, Delegation and Dysfunction, 35 
YALE J. ON REG. 233, 233 (2018). 
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entities, and the degree to which law does—and should—preserve 
such distinctions.144 
8. Creating responsive policies 
Collaborative groups operate as a self-updating system that can 
continuously adapt to new information and changed conditions.  
In 1992, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite introduced responsive 
regulation, in which regulated entities and private interests 
cooperate with regulators to create and enforce standards.145 
Agencies must continuously respond to emerging social,  
economic, and ecological information—having an established 
stakeholder group to consult in response to that information is 
valuable. Collaborative analysis is uniquely suited to responsive 
policymaking. A pre-existing group with established rules and 
relationships is always on-call for responding to new and updated 
information. Group members influenced by different information 
flows can pool data to predict trends or future events. Moreover, 
the group members may themselves generate or observe new 
information to allow timelier policymaking. 
Collaborative analysis also serves as a component of what 
Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Rhul describe as adaptive 
management: an iterative decision-making process, in which 
people learn from experience and incorporate new information to 
create a flexible management plan amidst changing conditions.146 
They note that collaborative adaptive management is present in 
medical device safety regulation, financial regulation, natural 
resource management, and social welfare systems.147 These 
observations suggest that there may be many realms within the 
 
 144. Although 4FRI lobbies Congress, an interviewee from another agency noted that 
“we are pretty careful not to encourage stakeholders to lobby Congress” and suggested that 
lobbying is “rare” and resisted the implication “that Federal agencies work with NGOs to 
lobby Congress on our behalf.” E-mail from Interviewee 6 to author (on file with author). 
 145. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109; Parker, supra note 9, at 2, 7 (describing 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s book as “canonical,” but noting that, despite their reliance on law 
and economic justifications for responsive regulation, the field of law and economics had not 
engaged deeply with their ideas). 
 146. Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014); see also Kirk Emerson et al., An Integrative 
Framework for Collaborative Governance, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 2 (2011) (describing 
collaborative governance, which is similar to adaptive management). 
 147. Craig & Rhul, supra note 146, at 1. 
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administrative state in which collaborative analysis can contribute 
to policymaking. 
B. Considering Counterarguments 
Along with its benefits, collaborative analysis is not without 
critiques. In this section, I address head-on the arguments of 
collaborative analysis critics, namely that a group is prone to: 
irrational cognitive distortions, agency capture by interest groups, 
lack of participation by lesser-advantaged stakeholders, and 
substantively worse decisions.  
Evidence from the social sciences suggests that scholarly 
concerns about the irrationality of individuals assessing evidence 
may be overstated. I suspect that environmental justice concerns 
and agency capitulation to interest groups will occur under any 
decision technique. The question, then, is not whether risk 
management could lead to poor decisions—it surely could. The 
relevant question is whether it can sometimes lead to better decisions 
than reliance on isolated agency decision-making informed by 
analytic data; I answer this question with a resounding yes. 
1. Irrational cognitive distortions 
Behavioral economics is widely used to justify agencies’ need 
for cost-benefit analysis148 and perhaps provides the most 
persuasive argument against collaborative analysis. Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein draw upon behavioral economics to suggest that 
average people do poorly when making rational decisions about 
complex risks.149 Framed in terms of the earlier assessment of risk 
management,150 their position might suggest that the human brain 
evolved to gauge the risk of a lion attack, but cannot fathom the 
 
 148. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 149. Id. at 137 (“People often make poor choices.”); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 354 
(“Human beings have a great deal of difficulty in assessing risks, making them prone to both 
hysteria and neglect . . . .”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory 
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 62 (1995) (“Where differences stem from cognitive errors, such as 
the availability heuristic, policymakers can properly exert leadership and not defer to 
lay assessments.”). Dan Kahan questioned the theoretical underpinnings, noting that 
empirical findings on risk perception in the social sciences contradict the anti-populist 
aspects of Sunstein’s account. Kahan et al., supra note 104, at 1104. 
 150. See supra Part I. 
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likely effects of an invisible, global problem. Sunstein advocates for 
agencies to use cost-benefit analysis to analyze and set policy.151 
Courts should support this, Sunstein argues, by deferring to “the 
purely factual judgments of scientific experts” (i.e., agencies) to 
avoid hysterical responses by the broader public.152   
One can imagine the argument that groups, like individuals, are 
subject to a variety of biases that can produce bad decisions. Indeed, 
groups may be even worse—members might reinforce each other’s 
irrational choices.153 If we accept this as true, then the question 
emerges: why are agencies, essentially a group of policymakers, not 
themselves subject to such biases? Of course, they are. But, the 
argument goes, agencies are subject to oversight, whereas private 
groups are not, and officials may reduce the potential for errors 
through awareness of them.154 Advocates for agency-determined 
policies focus on the good outcomes that top-down, data-driven 
regulations have achieved.155 
My response begins with questioning the claim that private 
groups are inherently suspect, and agencies are somehow a 
panacea against lousy decision-making. Critics of cost-benefit 
analysis note that there are several instances when agencies made 
the wrong call concerning risk or would have if using data-driven 
 
 151. Others have argued against widespread adoption of cost-benefit analysis on 
practical and moral grounds. Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling mount the primary 
critique of the cost-benefit approach. In a multi-pronged attack, they argue that the tool is at 
once amoral and leads to poor decisions. They argue instead for adoption of the 
Precautionary Principle of avoiding potentially harmful approaches. See generally FRANK 
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND 
THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
 152. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683, 737, 739 (1999) (“[A] properly functioning government committed to people’s 
well-being will not respond mechanically to expressions of anxiety.”); see also Pildes & 
Sunstein, supra note 149, at 52 (noting that “CBA and comparative risk assessment . . . often 
appear to be the most promising means” of making sure that “social resources are devoted 
to the most serious problems”). When public opinion pushes agencies towards decisions not 
indicated by cost-benefit analysis, Sunstein suggests that agencies should “bow to some 
degree of such concerns while nevertheless overriding them when possible.” SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 111. 
 153. For a discussion of group polarization, see Sunstein, supra note 130; cf. Kahan et 
al., supra note 104, at 1103. 
 154. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 65–127 
(2005) (noting that agency experts are better-positioned to avoid the errors that distort the 
risk assessments of the broader citizenry). 
 155. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 129–32 (listing decision-making biases). 
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analysis.156 Agency decisions leading to population collapse of a 
caribou herd, causing Alaskan Natives to die of starvation, provide 
a compelling reminder that agency officials can make good and bad 
decisions when employing any decision tool. Such reliance on 
anecdote questions the soundness of the premise. Having flagged 
this point, I set it aside and turn to the broader point. 
The argument that the agency action in isolation is the best 
choice presumes a reality that does not exist, namely that agencies 
can make decisions isolated from public reaction. Disaggregating 
agency policymaking into staggered steps of assessment, 
management, and implementation creates a distortion whereby 
scholars pretend that agencies can make decisions in a vacuum and 
can put forward pure data-based assessments immune from  
public or industry response. Yet, agencies must deal with the public 
at some point. The question, then, is really when and how the 
agency chooses to engage with the public. There are essentially 
three options: 
First, the agency can decide in isolation and try to sneak or 
shove its decision through without public approval. This  
approach rolls the dice on potential litigation. If the decision is not 
detected, perhaps it will not be disputed. But, if agencies make 
important decisions with inadequate public input, the backlash can 
prove intense.  
Second, the agency can make a management decision based on 
risk assessment data, then try to garner public support or withstand 
public controversy before codifying its decision. This is the model 
implicitly envisioned by the analytic-data approach. This approach 
can incur substantial implementation delays if stakeholders object 
to either the assessment or the management decision. Stakeholders 
can litigate or force an agency to go back to the drawing board to 
incorporate unaddressed concerns. 
Third, under the collaborative approach, an agency identifies a 
problem, then works with stakeholders to determine what data is 
needed, gathers the data, and asks the collaboration for 
recommendations that account for the social, economic, and 
ecological criteria. Public concerns are embedded in the decision-
making process early, and, as a result, agencies can focus some 
 
 156. Ackerman et al., supra note 96, at 156. 
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degree of data towards addressing the concerns at the assessment 
stage. Agencies still, clearly and definitively, exercise final decision-
making authority over the policy—they cannot give that away. 
Cass Sunstein acknowledges that agencies sometimes cannot 
reach the policy outcome that the data would argue is the “right” 
one because public input derails the agency from selecting the 
appropriate result. Given that this critique could apply to all three 
decision-making approaches, the question is not whether to engage 
the public, but rather how and when. Under any scenario, then, 
agencies must interface with the very public that behavioral 
economists distrust. They can do so under an adversarial, defensive 
posture under the first alternative; from a somewhat more open but 
still top-down approach in the second example; or from the  
basis that they are in a shared decision space that depends upon 
early incorporation of, although not necessarily acquiescence to, 
public opinion. 
2. Capture 
One critique of collaboration is that it is, in fact, legally 
sanctioned agency capture. Agency capture occurs when agencies 
look primarily to one interest group to provide inputs into the 
regulatory process to the exclusion of other interest groups.157 For 
collaborative analysis, the specific concern is that an agency would 
make a second-best policy decision to maintain good relationships 
with the stakeholder collaboration.158 Even if this is true, it is not 
necessarily undesirable. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite provide  
a game-theoretic model of capture showing that some degree  
of agency capture, particularly in response to group decision-
making, can be beneficial.159 Moreover, an agency can change 
course without additional procedures if it discovers that it made 
the wrong choice. 
 
 157. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006). 
 158. In one incident, a scientist approached an agency official to complain that a 
decision was clearly against scientific evidence that supported an alternate approach. “I 
know,” the agency official conceded, “but I have to keep the ranchers happy.” Interview on 
file with author. 
 159. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 109, at 55–81. 
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The more troubling capture concern is that an agency might 
favor a particular interest group, rather than the stakeholder group 
collectively. Some environmental groups suggest that stakeholder 
participation is a way for agencies to maintain the appearance of a 
neutral process while giving industrial interests what they want. 
To some extent, Congress has addressed this concern by 
passing the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). As 
explained in the companion to this Article, FACA  
outlines how federal agencies may partner with citizens and 
private entities. FACA applies when agencies coordinate with an 
organized, cohesive group of non-agency actors—long-term 
consultants, nongovernmental organizations, companies, or 
industry groups—for input on agency policies and decisions. It 
does not apply to government-to-government coordination, as 
when a federal agency works with tribal, state, or local 
governments. The applicability of FACA is governed by a few 
court decisions, which collectively suggest that if the agency 
convenes or controls an ongoing group with a limited 
membership that produces consensus and recommendations, 
then it must seek FACA certification. At the time of this writing, 
over 1,000 FACA certified collaborations exist.  
 Congress enacted FACA before alternative dispute resolution 
and collaborative government became widely popular, according 
to some agencies.  As a result, some officials view the statute as 
out-of-step with modern imperatives to collaborate. FACA 
certification can take years to complete, a fact that can serve as a 
major impediment to the formation of a new group. Indeed, 
agencies actively counsel employees on how to construct 
stakeholder groups that do not trigger the need for FACA 
certification. The danger of avoiding FACA certification is that 
agency decisions made in consultation with non-certified 
stakeholder collaborations may run afoul of the non-delegation 
doctrine, which limits agencies’ ability to share decision-making 
authority provided by Congress.160 
A variety of doctrines, statutes, and case holdings require 
agencies to retain final decision-making authority over 
management decisions, even when working with collaborations.161 
 
 160. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 456–58 (internal citations omitted). 
 161. Id. at 444. 
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Yet, agencies must share decision-making space to some degree to 
motivate stakeholders to participate in a collaboration. For 
example, leaders in two Alaskan Native communities refused to 
participate in the WACHWG collaboration when it became clear 
that the Alaska Department of Fish and Game would not share its 
decision-making authority. If stakeholders do not believe that an 
agency will implement the collaboration’s recommendation, they 
have minimal incentive to continue collaborating. 
In requiring agencies to both engage with stakeholders and 
retain sole final decision-making authority, Congress has created a 
problematic situation. Readers should not misunderstand this 
observation as a call for Congress to relax agencies’ decision-
making authority over public land and resources. The non-
delegation doctrine and related laws exist for numerous reasons, 
including to ensure that agencies manage resources in the public 
trust—for the collective benefit of all citizens.162 And stakeholder 
collaborations tend to be local. Agency accountability to both the 
local stakeholder collaborations and the political influence of the 
executive branch therefore provides a check on localized power 
over resources. This point underscores, however, the challenges 
agencies face in retaining sole decision-making authority while 
motivating stakeholders. 
To navigate this balance, agencies seem to be paying lip service 
to retaining sole decision-making authority while actually sharing 
some portion of decision space. The 4FRI collaboration case study 
that I presented in another recent article illustrates this point: the 
defining narrative of the group centers on the objection process for 
the first Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in which the 
collaboration participated.163 The Forest Service Regional Forester 
handled the objection process by referencing the group decision-
making process when evaluating the objections of a non-group-
member, WildEarth Guardians. This suggests a special status for 
collaborations not available to the public. The 4FRI stakeholders felt 
validated when the agencies’ official decision-making essentially 
rubberstamped the collaboration’s recommendation. The agency’s 
support of the collaboration’s consideration—even in a space in 
 
 162. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES 
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 1–21 (1993). 
 163. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 472. 
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which the agency ostensibly had sole authority—illustrates the fine 
line agency officials must walk. 
Stakeholders participate in collaborations because they have a 
significant financial or cultural interest in the land and resources at 
stake.164 Stakeholders are highly motivated to participate when 
they believe that they can protect and advance their interests 
through participating in a collaboration. The less likely the agency 
is to follow the recommendation of the collaboration, the less 
motivated stakeholders will become to collaborate. If the 
stakeholders are sufficiently reflective of the interests at play, 
capture concerns in this process will neutralize as the collaboration 
must reach mutually acceptable outcomes among opposed parties. 
Juidical review is another factor mitigating the capture concern. 
Courts are expert in evaluating procedural fairness. And they have 
repeatedly shown a willingness to evaluate the procedural fairness 
of public participation rather than accepting the mere existence of 
some collaboration as per se evidence of inclusion. In Western 
Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink,165 a federal district court 
reviewed the Bureau of Land Management’s revisions to 
regulations regarding public input on cattle grazing on public land. 
Rules promulgated in 1995 “gave extensive consideration to  
public participation in rangeland management.”166 In response, 
industry group National Cattlemen’s Beef Association proposed 
revisions, including limits to public participation in day-to-day 
grazing matters. 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) adopted these 
suggestions and published proposed rules changing the public 
participation process in two ways. First, it redefined the “interested 
public” that would receive notifications of BLM decisions, noting 
that the agency planned to drop from the notification list any group 
that did not comment on every decision.167 This created a 
burdensome requirement that stakeholders provide hundreds of 
comments a year on matters of varying importance to receive 
 
 164. This accords with general economic understanding that people with diffuse 
interests will not invest in protecting their interests. See generally MANCUR OLSON JR, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 165. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Idaho 2008). 
 166. Id. at 1306. 
 167. Id. at 1309. 
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information. Second, the new rule limited BLM’s duty to “consult, 
cooperate, and coordinate (CCC) with the interested public” on 
permitting decisions.168 It exempted several categories of decision-
making from the CCC requirements. 
The BLM justified these limitations to public participation citing 
that it incurred “substantial expenses” mailing notices to the 
public.169 It also noted that “in-depth public involvement can delay 
routine management responses . . . . Cooperation with permittees 
and lessees [cattle ranchers], on the other hand, usually results in 
more expeditious steps to address resource conditions and can help 
avoid lengthy administrative appeals.”170 An interdisciplinary 
team of experts reviewed these planned changes and found that 
limiting public input would likely worsen land management 
decisions and cause environmental harm. The report concluded 
that broadened public participation was desirable. Despite this, 
BLM published a notice in the Federal Register to adopt the new 
rules. An estimated 5000 public comments opposed the new rules 
during the notice-and-comment period. The BLM finalized the 
rules, despite these objections. A nongovernmental organization 
sued, arguing that the decision violated multiple federal statutes.171 
The federal district court found that limiting public 
participation and CCC duties limited the ability of the public to 
assess policy decisions.172 It noted that “the changes substantially 
affect both the amount and quality of public input” and would 
“freeze the public out” from some decisions.173 The court held that 
the revisions facially violated mandatory provisions in the Federal 
Land Policy Management Act requiring public input.174 In dicta, the 
court also suggested that such limitations on public input violated 
NEPA requirements for public participation.175 Notably, this case 
emerged from Idaho, a Western state with strong cattle ranching 
interests. It indicates a high degree of judicial willingness to 
 
 168. Id. at 1309–10. 
 169. Id. at 1312–13. 
 170. Id. at 1313. 
 171. Id. at 1311–12. 
 172. Id. at 1314–15. 
 173. Id. at 1314. 
 174. Id. at 1316. 
 175. Id. at 1315. 
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scrutinize agency action to respond to one set of stakeholders while 
excluding another. 
Even assuming that we accept concerns of capture, I remain 
unconvinced that this differentiates collaborative analysis from 
other forms of agency decision-making. As early as 1965, economist 
Myrick Freeman noted that “such noneconomic factors as the pork- 
barrel, logrolling, and empire building play an important role” in 
outcomes reached by cost-benefit analysis.176 More recently, 
Professor Sidney Shapiro has offered a scathing account of how 
presidential administrations can politicize risk assessment.177 
Shapiro notes that many choices are discretionary, and 
discretionary choices at the assessment phase can lead to different 
management decisions.178 In one example, industry undertakes the 
risk assessment independently. It then provides the results to the 
agency, despite concerns that the industrial actors have strong 
incentives to craft research that advances their interests.179 
The case Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel180 serves as a reminder of 
how an agency can go to great lengths to gather high-quality data, 
then ignore it for political reasons. In Hodel, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service decided not to list the Northern Spotted Owl as a 
threatened species, despite a consensus among biologists that 
doing so was scientifically indicated.181 A federal district court held 
that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and 
remanded the decision to the agency. The issue became so 
politicized that President Clinton held a listening session with 
stakeholders in the Pacific Northwest on the issue during his first 
month in office. This example of the Spotted Owl suggests that 
when public stakes are high enough, the decision will be shifted out 
of agency hands and escalated to the President.182  
The central concern about collaborative analysis should be 
exclusion rather than capture. For the reasons outlined above, 
 
 176. A. Myrick Freeman, III, Six Federal Reclamation Projects and the Distribution of 
Income, 3 WATER RESOURCES RES. 319, 331 (1967) (studying six cost-benefit analyses for 
Bureau of Reclamation process and finding the results reflective of political influence); cf. 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 154155, at 162 (stating that cost-benefit analysis avoids agency capture). 
 177. Shapiro, supra note 19. 
 178. Id. at 1089–90. 
 179. Id. at 1097–98. 
 180. N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2297–98. 
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judicial intervention will do much to avoid agencies using 
collaborations to benefit one group unfairly. Strong interest groups 
excluded from decision-making can use litigation or lobbying to 
advocate for their view. But this relies upon access to resources; 
some stakeholders are better positioned to participate in 
collaborations because they have the time and money to attend. 
This is true even when other, less well-off stakeholders have a keen 
interest in the outcome of a decision. 
3. Inclusiveness 
Which stakeholders get a seat at the table? Inclusiveness is a 
central concern of collaborative analysis. If agencies are 
incorporating the input of stakeholders representing diverse 
interests without leaving anyone out, there are many reasons to feel 
optimistic about the process. But if some genuinely interested 
voices do not find their way into the collaborative analysis, that  
is problematic. 
Although an agency might sometimes explicitly and knowingly 
invite some stakeholder perspectives while limiting others, such 
overt action is clear to a court and the public.183 The more insidious 
issue of exclusion occurs when an agency offers many stakeholders 
the opportunity to participate in an ostensibly neutral way, but 
external circumstances preclude involvement from stakeholders 
with a deep interest. Such a lack of participation is unlikely to rise 
to the level of judicial notice, as the stakeholders who might raise 
the issues lack the resources to do so. 
Environmental justice theory describes some stakeholders as 
repeatedly disadvantaged because of their race, lower socio-
economic-status, less education, age, gender, or rural living 
conditions, which make them less able to influence government 
decisions.184 President Clinton issued an executive order requiring 
agencies to analyze the effect of their decisions on historically 
disadvantaged groups.185 But these legal and moral requirements 
 
 183. But see W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Idaho 
2008) (partially overturned on other grounds). 
 184. KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CREATING EQUALITY, 
RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY 6–8 (2002). 
 185. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
note (2018). 
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alone cannot overcome practical realities. For collaborative 
analysis, environmental justice concerns suggest that 
commentators should focus on including stakeholders who lack the 
resources necessary to participate but have an interest in the 
resources at stake. 
 Consider the example of the environmental justice issues 
incumbent in the WACHWG case study. Earlier, the case study 
reported that several tribal representatives from Alaskan 
communities have flown to Anchorage several times a year, for 
decades, to participate in the collaborations. In this Section, I situate 
the representatives’ ongoing involvement against the social, 
geographic, and economic hardship in their lives. The point that 
emerges is that the people most imperiled by failed risk 
management may face the highest marginal cost of participating in 
a collaboration to manage that policy. I sketch the details of this 
dilemma below. 
Contrast the difficulties borne by the representatives of the 
Alaskan Native communities to those of other stakeholders in the 
Western Arctic Caribou Herd. Agency officials, representatives of 
extractive industries, state and local government officials, and 
employees of environmental nongovernmental organizations are 
all receiving their wages for attending meetings—it is part of their 
jobs. This allows these stakeholders to engage in careful, data-
intensive decision-making. But it can serve as a functional bar 
against the perspectives of stakeholders whose time and expenses 
are not well funded.186 
Stakeholders with lower incomes but strong interests in the 
land and resources at issue may be displaced by stakeholder 
collaborations, relative to less-intensive public participation 
processes, such as notice-and-comment periods.187 Collaboration 
disadvantages interested stakeholders with insufficient resources 
to express that interest through attending meetings, relative to 
 
 186. ORR, supra note 73. 
 187. For example, the annual Western Arctic Caribou Herd Working Group 
(WACHWG) meetings take place over two to three days in a location that is several flights 
away from villages in which caribou are a primary food source. The 4FRI meetings take place 
midmorning on weekdays. Hourly workers or stay-at-home parents might find either 
meeting difficult to attend, which contributes to the likelihood that only well-funded 
stakeholder collaborations, such as industrial interests and nongovernmental organizations, 
will be able to afford to send representatives. 
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attending a one-time listening session, or participating in public 
comment periods. 
One response to this concern may be that sufficiently motivated 
stakeholders will pool resources to fund representation in 
collaborations. This may be true for certain interests, as with 
sportsmen groups who have organized to quite effectively 
represent hunting and fishing interests. It is also true for 
representatives from Alaskan Native communities, whose deep 
reliance on caribou have driven long-term involvement in the 
collaboration in which communities pool resources to send 
representatives. But this optimistic account fails to take into 
account the social and economic costs borne by rural populations 
who cannot afford to participate but also cannot afford not to. 
Although this discussion focuses on Alaskan Native 
communities, the issue of involving all stakeholders in 
collaborations is a national issue.188 
 Having detailed these concerns, I now situate them relative to 
other alternatives. Despite the practical difficulty, a core tenet of 
collaborative analysis is giving voice to groups who are unable to 
participate in cost-benefit analysis and litigation. At least with 
collaborative analysis, it is clear who the group is including—
something that other approaches may obscure. 
 Highlighting the problem also shines attention on the need for 
more and better solutions. The current state of inclusiveness in 
collaborative analysis can and should be improved over time. 
Doing so can achieve some of the aims of restorative  
 
 188. It is striking that 4FRI, the most lauded stakeholder collaboration in the Forest 
Service, does not have tribal representatives who belong to the collaboration. A stakeholder 
notes: “I would say we classically miss, and this is across the West, our tribal partners. We 
have been less than successful at engaging our tribal nations, and there are a lot of reasons 
for that.” BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 39. Several factors can give rise to tribes not being 
represented, although these considerations differ on a tribe-by-tribe basis given the broad 
diversity of tribal resources and objectives. Further, tribes have a special status, and may 
elect to become involved in resource management from a government-to-government 
relationship instead, under the Section 7 Consultation requirement of NEPA. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321 to 4370m-12 (2012). Tribes electing to rely solely on this option should not, and 
legally cannot, have their perspective dismissed because they did not participate in the 
collaboration. Given the specialized legal status of tribes under NEPA, agencies cannot 
legally overlook the obligation to consult with tribes. 
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justice.189 Consciously integrating the principles of restorative 
justice—such as flexibility and responsiveness—into stakeholder 
collaboration may serve to improve participation among lesser-
advantaged groups.  
 As a concluding thought on this point, I return to the initial 
point that inclusion remains the central and most pressing critique 
of collaborative analysis. I have some suggestions for how to 
improve, but not solve, these concerns. But I do not claim to solve 
them—instead to suggest that under present circumstances that 
this solution likely operates better—on a relative basis—than other 
risk management tools at balancing opportunities for meaningful 
input with stakeholders with widely divergent access to resources. 
4. Decision quality 
How do collaborations perform relative to alternative 
approaches? Claims about the successes of collaborations are not 
relative; there is a limited empirical basis for the claim that they 
work better than alternative methods. Interestingly, the same 
collaboration can generate sharply different assessments of success, 
as illustrated by the enthusiasm with which agency officials speak 
of 4FRI contrasted with the scathing newspaper editorial on the 
subject.190 This divergence highlights the absence of defined metrics 
by which to judge a collaboration, either in isolation or relative to 
other means of engagement.  
When asked about successful and unsuccessful collaborations, 
the answers of agency officials were anecdotal and involved  
stories of collaborations that produced either positive or negative 
outcomes. While several interviewees shared stories comparing 
successful and unsuccessful collaborations, some retracted  
these statements out of fear that critique would undermine  
the unsuccessful collaborations that are still in operation. For  
that reason, I cannot provide specific instances of  
 
 189. John Braithwaite, Relational Republican Regulation, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 124, 125 
(2013); Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Restorative Justice: Thinking Relationally About Justice, in BEING 
RELATIONAL: REFLECTIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW 89, 89–93 (Jocelyn 
Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn eds., 2012). 
 190. Compare Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 476–77, with Editorial, Our View: The Forest 
Service Shouldn’t Pat Itself on the Back Yet, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:49 PM), 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/editorial/2015/04/22/fri-deal-struck-last-get-
thinning/26212565/. 
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unsuccessful collaborations but flag the vital point that some 
collaborations fail.191 
In terms of evaluating the success and failures of collaborations, 
it is important to note that non-empirical feedback can be useful. 
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner have justified monetizing benefits 
and harms by analogizing quantification to corporations’ use of net 
present value to evaluate various projects.192 They suggest that calls 
against quantification are “bizarre,” noting that CEOs regularly 
engage in similar methods of assessing projects developed by 
various department heads.193 This point provides an accurate, but 
incomplete, account of corporate decision-making. CEOs regularly 
engage with division heads and other team members—including 
suppliers and customers—to evaluate how various projects and 
divisions are performing.  Just as a CEO would be derelict in not 
requiring financial analysis of proposed projects, so too would she 
fall short if she neglected ongoing project management. Thus, to the 
extent that we look to real-world corporate practice to justify 
quantification, so too can we find support there for how to evaluate 
collaborative analysis. 
A pernicious effect of collaboration is that it gives the appearance 
of a democratic process, which makes the agencies’ decisions more 
defensible in court. “In one example, members of the local 
environmental community refused to participate in a collaboration 
because they felt that previous collaborations amounted to a series 
of elaborate hand-waving by the agency to give the appearance of  
appropriate democratic process while giving ranchers the grazing 
access they wanted.”194 In another example, a member of an 
independent scientific review board examining agency action was 
 
 191. These withdrawals should cause future researchers to be thoughtful about the 
incentives for self-assessment by agency officials and stakeholders in evaluating the success 
of ongoing collaborations. Officials’ unwillingness to engage with negative assessments of 
collaborations also raises broader questions—outside of the context of this Article—about 
the degree to which norms against talking about the challenging aspects of collaboration 
hampers the potential for healthy collaborations, limits the ability to meaningfully assess the 
relative merit of collaboration, and may be reflective of entrenched agency culture or 
location-specific norms. Importantly, the individual interviewees are operating in the 
political and social realities of the situation; they do not personally bear responsibility for the 
larger issues, they merely reflect them. 
 192. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 935, 940 (2018). 
 193. Id. at 941. 
 194. Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 485. 
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surprised to learn that the local agency position was mainly 
acquiescence to local ranching interests. When the member of the 
review board protested that this was inconsistent with the 
requirements of the Endangered Species Act and other federal laws, 
the agency official acknowledged this as accurate but nevertheless 
refused to budge. 
Regardless of external measures of collaboration successes, 
there remains a powerful but inchoate sense among agency officials 
that collaborations work to advance agency goals.195 This sense of 
collaboration, as reflective of democratic principles, is also 
discernible in the language of the congressional acts and executive 
orders requiring collaboration.  
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis Fails and Collaborative Analysis Works 
Cost-benefit analysis works quite well in some contexts. 
Volumes of books and academic articles make this point; I do not 
attempt to replicate them here. Sometimes, however, cost-benefit 
analysis is poorly matched to the question at hand. Under such 
conditions, policymakers can select collaborative analysis from the 
buffet of available choices. It works in situations in which cost-
benefit analysis fails: in weighting distributions and in assessing 
the social acceptability of outcomes. 
First, U.S. agencies using cost-benefit analysis do not engage 
different considerations for distribution—or moral—outcomes. 
This is antithetical to how the creators of cost-benefit analysis 
thought that government would use the tool; it can lead to  
perverse results. Proponents acknowledge the limitations of 
quantitative analysis in assessing risk but suggest that it is the best 
available tool.196  
Although generally conceived of as a data-driven tool, cost-
benefit analysis also reflects normative judgments. Through the 
process of the distributional weighting of various inputs, value 
 
 195. A government biologist reflected this sentiment, saying, “Just as a person, I think 
it is valuable to collaborate with people who are invested in decisions that you make. So I 
think [stakeholder collaborations] are pretty important.” Interview 10 (on file with author). 
 196. For a discussion of scholarly responses to the analysis of limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis, see generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 151. 
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judgments shape economic outputs.197 Even ostensibly neutral 
choices in cost-benefit analysis reflect distributional outcomes—
there is no escaping the normative component of policymaking. 
Despite this, scholars have differed on how agencies should assign 
distributional weights for over sixty years. Indeed, the issue of 
distributional weighting forms a central debate within law and 
economics scholarship on cost-benefit analysis today.198  
Economists have long acknowledged that the person creating a 
cost-benefit analysis must incorporate subjective judgments,199 
judgments which economists were ill-suited to make.200 In 1961, 
Otto Eckstein noted, “[I]n no event should the technician arrogate 
the weighting of objectives to himself by presenting a one-
dimensional answer after burying the weighting process in . . . 
technical details.”201 In the 1950s, mainstream neoclassical 
economists and agricultural economists argued for consumer 
sovereignty—that market prices and shadow prices should weight 
the analysis.202 Others argued that markets failed to capture these 
values because the relevant metric was a political community, not 
the mere aggregation of the preferences of individual citizens.203 
For example, Arthur Maass suggested that Congress should review 
 
 197. H. Spencer Banzhaf, Objective or Multi-Objective? Two Historically Competing Visions 
for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 85 LAND ECON. 3, 3-4, 6 (2009) (describing Maas’ vision for cost-
benefit analysis taking into account distributional effects of decisions, which ultimately did 
not come into fruition). 
 198. Weisbach, supra note 97 (overviewing scholarship arguing for and against 
distributional weighting). 
 199. Economic history reflects that the pioneers of cost-benefit analysis were deeply 
concerned with the subjective nature of weighing factors. Banzhaf, supra note 197, at 6. 
 200. Matthew D. Adler, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview, 10 
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 264, 264 (2016) (summarizing the literature from the debate 
among economists on distributional weighting in the 1950s); Otto Eckstein, A Survey of the 
Theory of Public Expenditure Criteria, in PUBLIC FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES, AND UTILIZATION 
439, 449 (1961). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See, e.g., DANIEL HOROWITZ, THE ANXIETIES OF AFFLUENCE: CRITIQUES OF 
AMERICAN CONSUMER CULTURE, 1939–1979, at 129–30 (2004); JAN L. LOGEMANN, TRAMS OR 
TAILFINS?: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROSPERITY IN POSTWAR WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED 
STATES 40 (2012); cf. JOY PARR, DOMESTIC GOODS: THE MATERIAL, THE MORAL, AND THE 
ECONOMIC IN THE POSTWAR YEARS, 84–100 (1999) (discussing Canada’s experience with 
consumer sovereignty in the agricultural market). 
 203. For a similar argument advanced by an environmental philosopher, see MARK 
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 31 (2d ed. 
2008). 
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programs justified by cost-benefit analysis, suggesting that only 
elected representatives should make social choices.204 
Questions surrounding assigning distributional weights 
presumably should have shifted from theory to practice when 
Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291, requiring agencies 
only to promulgate regulations for which the benefits exceeded the 
costs.205 Surprisingly, despite the rapid rise of the “cost-benefit 
state,” the question of distributional weighting has remained 
largely theoretical. Agencies virtually never use such distributional 
weighting in practice.206 
Scholars have recently revived the longstanding debate about 
incorporating distributional weighting into cost-benefit analysis.207 
Matthew Adler has argued for weighting and proposed using the 
social welfare function.208 David Weisbach, in contrast, argues that 
agencies are ill-suited to address distributional questions as a 
matter of institutional competency, and suggests the tax system is 
a superior mechanism for addressing inequality.209 Current 
proposals center around using the social welfare function, 
contingent valuation,210 or surveys of people’s happiness.211 Even 
ardent proponents of cost-benefit analysis acknowledge the 
limitations of such quantitative measures to capture human  
values such as wonder and awe.212 Some question whether 
 
 204. Arthur Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, 80 
Q. J. ECON. 208, 216–17 (1966) 
 205. Although cost-benefit emerged in the 1950s, it did not meaningfully intersect with 
policymaking for decades. Robert Dorfman, Mathematical, or “Linear,” Programming: A 
Nonmathematical Exposition, 43 AM. ECON. REV. 797, 797 (1953) (“[M]arginal analysis . . . has 
led to conclusions of great importance for the understanding of many questions of social and 
economic policy. But . . . this mode of analysis has not recommended itself to men of affairs 
for the practical solution of their economic and business problems.”). 
 206. Adler, supra note 200 (“[I]t appears that distributional weights have rarely if ever 
been used by [cost-benefit analysis] practitioners in the U.S. government . . . .”). 
 207. Weisbach, supra note 97. 
 208. Adler, supra note 200. 
 209. Weisbach, supra note 97, at 151–58. 
 210. Walter J. Mead, Review and Analysis of State-of-the-Art Contingent Valuation Studies, 
in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 305, 307–08 (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993). 
 211. John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 
1603, 1621 (2013). 
 212. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,  
786 (1994). 
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distributional weighting is even truly possible given agency 
resource constraints.213 
But despite scholars’ efforts to capture these non-numeric 
values in a cost-benefit framework, agencies often abandon cost-
benefit analysis altogether—especially when top-down 
management cannot provide socially acceptable results. In these 
circumstances, agencies often do not myopically apply top-down 
risk management. In practice, agencies avoid the theoretical flaws 
of cost-benefit analysis by employing different tools for conditions 
of concentrated localized effects (leading to distributional issues), 
uncertainty, and moral ambiguity. Agencies specifically rely on 
collaborative analysis, or bottom-up policy formation—gathering 
qualitative input from non-agency stakeholders who stand to 
internalize the beneficial and harmful potential of various policy 
outcomes.214 Despite its ubiquity in practice,215 scholars have 
largely overlooked this alternative approach to risk management.216 
Certainly, some scholars have suggested that only democratic 
processes or input, not economic analysis, can inform certain policy 
choices.217 Cass Sunstein notes: “[P]eople, in both the public and the 
private sectors, are invited to provide information about the likely 
consequences. For all that public officials know, private citizens 
know far more. They are indispensable to a full accounting.”218 
Similarly, Robert Dorfman suggests that value judgments implicit 
in economic models on points like the value of human life and 
 
 213. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 152 (questioning whether distributive 
weighting is, in fact, possible). 
 214. In some cases, particularly with technologically complex issues, inter-agency 
collaborative analysis may be necessary, in which many agency stakeholders operate 
together. Such inter-agency interactions have been noted in other contexts and exist already 
in risk management areas, like wildfire suppression. See generally Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency 
Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015); Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire 
Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2010). 
 215. Federal agencies make thousands of risk management decisions annually under a 
collaborative analysis model. See BRADSHAW, supra note 8, at 32–54. 
 216. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 83–87, 134–35 (overviewing alternatives to cost-
benefit analysis as including “intuitive” decision-making premised on the intuitions of the 
agency officials, not members of the public; later noting that that some areas of life, such as 
abortion, go through the political process, in which the public finds common ground by 
working through disagreement); Coates, supra note 19, at 903 (listing alternatives to cost-
benefit analysis but not including stakeholder-driven inputs). 
 217. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 134–35 (describing how the political process 
leads to exchange and compromise on decisions such as abortion). 
 218. SUNSTEIN, supra note 111. 
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endangered species are not questions of fact that experts are 
uniquely well-positioned to answer. Rather, they are “questions 
about social values and public preferences, that only the elaborate 
and clumsy procedures of democratic decision-making can 
answer.”219 Others have framed such considerations in terms of the 
robust debate about the relative merits of federalism and 
decentralization in achieving various regulatory objectives.220 
Despite some such acknowledgments, scholarly attention on 
the quantitative elements of cost-benefit analysis has largely 
overshadowed inquiry into the role of qualitative inputs in  
cost-benefit analysis and policymaking more broadly.221 Near-
universal enthusiasm for analytic data overestimates the potential 
of these tools, which, in turn, displaces other valid approaches to 
risk management. 
Law and economic literatures alike lack a robust descriptive 
account, theoretical basis, and normative assessment of how 
agencies consult with stakeholders to determine the value 
judgments embedded in policymaking. Under a collaborative 
analysis framework, agencies seek direct input from the most 
affected stakeholders on the very kinds of questions that cost-
benefit analysis cannot reach. These questions include what to do 
when data is unavailable,222 how to allocate the distributional 
effects of a policy223 and how to approach the moral implications of 
policies.224 Collaborative analysis operates as an alternative for top-
down decision-making; it is a crowdsourced variation of the kinds 
of calculations that agencies would make internally under top-
down models. Theoretically, it could also complement top-down 
 
 219. See ROBERT DORFMAN, Why Benefit-Cost Analysis Is Widely Disregarded and What to 
Do About It, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND PUBLIC DECISIONS 372, 373 (1997). 
 220. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,  
572 (1996). 
 221. See Coates, supra note 19, at 893–94 (noting that financial regulators discuss policies 
with other experts outside the agency). 
 222. See David Weisbach, Introduction: Legal Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty, 44 
J. LEGAL STUD. S319, S319 (2015). 
 223. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 74, at 152 (discussing when agencies should add 
distributional weights to a cost-benefit analysis); Weisbach, supra note 97 (suggesting that 
cost-benefit analysis is an inappropriate vehicle for considering distributional questions). 
 224. See Ackerman et al., supra note 96. 
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decision-making by, for example, generating more accurate inputs 
into a cost-benefit analysis.225 
This Article begins to fill the informational void surrounding 
collaborative analysis by answering the following interrelated 
questions: How do, and should, agencies consult with stakeholders 
to forecast policy outcomes and inform the value-laden 
distributional issues embedded in risk management policymaking? 
And how should courts evaluate such collaboration? 
Although the form of collaborative analysis differs from 
formulaic cost-benefit analysis, the function of weighing the pros 
and cons of various regulatory approaches is essentially the same. 
One key difference is who is considering the pros and cons of a 
potential policy. In cost-benefit analysis, it is technocratic officials; 
under a collaborative analysis model, citizens are working to weigh 
the relative choices. This key democratic element describes why 
scholars and agency officials alike should consider the situations in 
which collaborative analysis works better than cost-benefit 
analysis, particularly in incorporating value judgments into policy. 
D. When Collaborative Analysis Works Well and When It Does Not 
Collaborative analysis provides benefits relative to cost-benefit 
analysis. It is most appropriate in localized but high-stakes 
decisions that elude analytical exactness. Potential benefits include 
improving valuation assessments, facilitating Pareto superior 
outcomes, broadening perspectives, generating alternative data, 
increasing social acceptance, overcoming group polarization, 
enabling resource pooling, and creating responsive policy. There 
are times, however, when it would be disastrous to use 
collaborative analysis. Concentrated control of decisions led by 
expert input is most valuable for decisions that are: time-sensitive, 
national in scope, involve clear safety considerations, and those 
with complicated scientific and mathematical factors. 
Of course, the threshold question of whether stakeholders or 
academic experts should make decisions can lead to attempts to 
draw lines to suit one’s ideological aims: Are vaccines localized to 
the family or sufficiently scientific to be left to experts? Is coal 
 
 225. See supra Section II.A.4. 
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production about small Appalachian communities or the global 
issue of climate change? 
Some academics are concerned that legitimizing collaborative 
analysis dethrones the position of “experts” on vital social issues. 
A workshop attendee asked, “If climate change is a debate rather 
than a scientific truth, won’t that eliminate our ability to get 
anything done?” Ironically, I believe the answer to that question  
is no. 
Taking positions that one believes are correct and then 
defending those positions in litigation for decades can also be a bar 
to “getting things done.” This approach produces clear winners 
and losers—either “winning” side is heaping distributional  
costs on the losing side. As a result, the losing side hotly protests. 
Litigation or public stalemate ensues. Collaborative analysis, in 
contrast, opens the door to bargaining—allowing one party to 
achieve their objective, but requiring them to compensate the  
losing party. 
Collaborative analysis may prove most appropriate in 
situations that meet the following five criteria: 
(1) a controversial decision or set of decisions must be made 
about a problem; 
(2) that decision is characterized by deeply uncertain  
risks that are difficult to quantify using analytic- 
data techniques; 
(3) that decision is also subject to evolving social, economic, 
health, or ecological conditions; 
(4) the consequences of the decision will be felt by a 
concentrated, identifiable set of stakeholders with deep 
interests and differing perspectives; and 
(5) no single agency has the resources or expertise to make 
and execute a decision alone. 
Indeed, I later argue that these factors form the standard that courts 
should use to determine the appropriateness of agency reliance on 
stakeholder input in reaching a decision.226 
 
 226. See infra p. 170. 
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Some agency decisions do not require crowdsourced 
qualitative inputs because the risks are diffusely spread across the 
entire population. Thus, experts can discern the risks using the 
democratic processes that generally inform the executive branch. 
Speed limits, vaccine recommendations, airplane safety, and toxic 
chemical regulations all reflect such calculi.227 Even when the 
effects of decisions of considerable national importance 
disproportionately disfavor a particularized group, those decisions 
can be justified in terms of a broader social good. 
 In contrast, risks with disproportionately concentrated effects 
and only local or regional benefits lend themselves to a more 
directed inquiry into the welfare of those most affected by positive 
or negative policy outcomes. Decisions such as whether to list a 
particular species as endangered, develop a highway through a 
specific state, or thin trees from a specific national forest to reduce 
wildfire risk all provide examples of localized considerations. In 
these contexts, agency decisions made without stakeholder input 
may prove unpopular, and, consequently, be stymied by social 
backlash and litigation. Collaborative analysis becomes 
particularly crucial for agencies managing risks in deeply uncertain 
conditions, in which the data is unavailable or inconclusive. 
 To what extent are collaborative analysis techniques displacing, 
complementing, or inputting into cost-benefit analysis? At the most 
basic level, qualitative inputs can inform technical cost-benefit 
analysis. “Where benefits are difficult to quantify and monetize, 
governments can work with [cost-benefit analysis] technical 
experts for guidance and solicit feedback from stakeholders.”228 
 Collaborative analysis can also work in tandem with analytic-
data techniques. For example, President Clinton issued an 
Executive Order requiring agencies to address issues of 
 
 227. The judicial branch has also successfully regulated diffuse risks. Cass R. Sunstein, 
On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 528 
(noting success of courts in regulating “DDT and airborne lead; control of asbestos, 
beryllium, and mercury; regulation of atmospheric loading, which produces acid deposition, 
disclosure requirements for hazardous chemicals; and regulation in the workplace of 
ethylene oxide and formaldehyde” (citations omitted)). 
 228. Darcy White & Torey Silloway, Cost-Benefit Analysis, EVIDENCE-BASED 
POLICYMAKING COLLABORATIVE (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.evidencecollaborative.org/ 
toolkits/cost-benefit-analysis. The Evidence-Based Policymaking Collaborative is comprised 
of the Urban Institute, Brookings Institution, American Enterprise Institute, and Pew-
MacArthur Results First Initiative. 
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environmental justice.229 Agencies could elect to satisfy this 
requirement by weighting cost-benefit analysis to account for 
environmental justice considerations, but they do not. Instead, they 
conduct parallel cost-benefit and environmental justice analyses. 
Collaborative analysis can also supplant cost-benefit analysis as a 
decision-making tool in some circumstances. Council on 
Environmental Quality regulations for pan-agency implementation 
of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)230 note  
that “the weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the  
various alternatives need not be displayed in a monetary cost-
benefit analysis and should not be when there are important 
qualitative considerations.”231 
E. Considering the Relative Roles of Cost-Benefit Analysis  
and Collaborative Analysis in the Climate Context 
To illustrate the relative benefits of the risk management tools 
of cost-benefit analysis and collaborative analysis, it is useful to 
consider how agencies are using both in the real world for a single 
issue: climate change.232 Given a large number of unknown factors, 
agency responses include elements of risk management in actions 
ranging from regulating solar geoengineering to funding flood 
insurance policies in coastal areas. Scholars and commentators 
have focused on two data-driven policies as the core of federal 
climate change mitigation: the Clean Power Plan promulgated by 
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Paris Agreement.233 
 
 229. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
note (2018). 
 230. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370m-12 (2018). 
 231. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2019) (emphasis added). 
 232. See Daniel A. Farber, Catastrophic Risk, Climate Change, and Disaster Law, 16 ASIA 
PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 37 (2013). 
 233.  40 C.F.R. pt. 60; Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic 
Climate Agreement, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/energy-environment/wp/2015/12/12/proposed-historic-climate-pact-nears-final-
vote/; Glenn Sheriff, Burden Sharing Under the Paris Climate Agreement (Nat’l Ctr. for 
Envtl. Econ., Working Paper No. 16-04, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2016-09/documents/2016-04_0.pdf. 
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Several commentators have expressed grave concerns about the 
eventual fate of these policy efforts within the United States.234 
Collaborative analysis is emerging as the front lines of the 
federal response to climate change. Richard Posner has noted that 
climate change is the “poster child for the limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis.”235 Climate scholars differentiate mitigation, which focuses 
on lessening anthropocentric climate change by reducing 
emissions, from response, which is reacting to the results of climate 
change, such as heightened sea levels and increased wildfire risk. 
Scholars, courts, and commentators have focused mainly on federal 
mitigation efforts premised on scientific and economic modeling.236 
Meanwhile, federal land and resource management agencies are on 
the front lines of climate change response even when the agency 
does not directly link the efforts to climate change. Such agencies 
focus on response, such as protecting at-risk wildlife and 
responding to catastrophic wildfires—tasks that cannot wait for 
Congressional action.237 In these contexts, agencies use stakeholder 
engagement to gather resources and make controversial decisions 
amidst incomplete data.238 
 
 234. In 2017, President Trump announced that the United States will withdraw from 
the Paris Agreement. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 1, 2017 3:32 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/ 
statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord; Eli Stokols, Donald Trump Withdraws from 
Paris Climate Deal Despite Allies’ Opposition, WALL STREET J. (June 2, 2017 12:44 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-to-exit-paris-climate-deal-officials-say-
1496343854. Parties challenged The Clean Power Plan in court; President Trump later 
announced that he intended to repeal it. Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court 
Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-
coal-emissions-regulations.html; Robinson Meyer, Will a Reconfigured Supreme Court Help 
Obama’s Clean-Power Plan Survive?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2016/02/antonin-scalia-clean-power-plan-obama-climate-
change/462807/. 
 235. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 155 (2004). But see 
Sunstein, supra note 18, at 381 (suggesting the use of maximin in situations, like climate 
change, where there exists “genuine uncertainty, in which probabilities cannot be assigned 
to the expected outcomes”). 
 236. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.
pdf; 40 C.F.R. pt. 60; Warrick & Mooney, supra note 233. 
 237. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. 330 (2014). 
 238.  See Bradshaw, supra note 69, at 467–77; Facemire & Bradshaw, supra note 21 
(presenting a case study of several agencies cooperating to manage orca pods in the Puget 
Sound); infra Part I (presenting a case study of stakeholder collaboration to manage an 
Alaskan caribou herd). 
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President Obama issued an Executive Order anticipating the 
need for collaborative analysis in this area, noting, “Managing 
these risks requires deliberate preparation, close cooperation, and 
coordinated planning by the Federal Government, as well as by 
stakeholders, to facilitate Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector, 
and nonprofit-sector efforts to improve climate preparedness and 
resilience . . . .”239 Yet, current accounts of federal climate change, 
response, and risk management fail to account for the prominent 
role cost-benefit analysis is playing in practice. 
Agencies are using a hybrid of analytic-data and collaborative 
analysis approach to create localized climate response policies. The 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service relies on collaborative tools made 
with stakeholders to make species-level decisions, including 
Recovery Plans, Candidate Conservation Agreements, and Habitat 
Conservation Plans. The Forest Service has implemented a 
nationwide Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program 
to create socially acceptable policies to reduce wildfire 
management costs.240 These examples highlight a broader point: 
Hundreds of stakeholder groups across more than one dozen 
agencies are using collaborative analysis to assess and respond to 
climate change risks. Anecdotally, stakeholder groups may reduce 
the polarizing effects of climate change in policy implementation.  
In sum, agencies are using collaborative analysis to manage 
federal climate change response actions. Certainly, data on 
emissions is essential to developing EPA mitigation policies. Still, 
alternative forms of data, such as observations about permafrost 
melt from Alaskan Native communities, are also playing a vital role 
in agency action. Existing accounts of federal climate change risk 
management largely overlook the part of collaborative analysis. 
Yet, collaborative analysis may be doing the bulk of the work in 
response efforts. Incorporating this approach into future scholarly 
inquiry may produce a more complete account of how agencies are 
managing climate change response and other policy issues. 
 
 239. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. at 330. 
 240. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 4003, 123 
Stat. 991, 1141 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 7303 (2018)). 
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III. DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Judges reviewing challenges to an agency decision informed by 
cost-benefit analysis or collaborative analysis should engage in a 
two-step inquiry: First, the court should determine whether the 
agency used an appropriate tool given the specific context of the 
case. If the tool selected was appropriate, the inquiry should then 
turn to the use of the tool itself. Thus, second, the court should 
evaluate whether the tool was deployed correctly. Others have 
thoroughly covered the subject of how judges review the 
methodological correctness of cost-benefit analysis.241 I apply their 
same analysis of the correct use to collaborative analysis. 
Importantly, the inquiry is on the procedural elements of the tool. 
The substantive outcomes and ultimate success of the usage falls 
outside the scope of judicial inquiry and is instead under the control 
of agencies. 
Under what conditions will an agency’s reliance on 
collaborative analysis satisfy judicial review that the agency’s 
decision is in keeping with the Administrative Procedure Act and 
other substantive statutes?  
Courts should acknowledge collaborative analysis as evidence 
that an agency has adequately considered a policy choice, provided 
that the agency met certain procedural protections. Collaborative 
analysis can complement, or even displace, top-down decision-
making, especially under circumstances of deep uncertainty and 
concentrated, identifiable potential harm.242 
Integrating collaborative analysis into judicial assessment of 
challenges to agency action is easier than it may appear. The first 
step is that courts must decide on a case-by-case basis when 
collaborative analysis satisfies the agency’s obligation to gather the 
information that informs policy choices.243 As I demonstrate below, 
courts have been balancing the need for cost-benefit analysis with 
alternative tools of public participation since at least 1974. I 
highlight the existing case law on this point and explain its 
relationship to a persistent debate in risk management literature. 
 
 241. See generally, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 192. 
 242. See supra Section II.D for a five-factor test of when collaborative analysis is  
most appropriate. 
 243. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
001.BRADSHAW_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:02 PM 
655 Stakeholder Collaboration 
 717 
 
Then, I argue that courts can streamline such analysis by employing 
my five-factor test of circumstances in which collaborative analysis 
works best.244 
A line of jurisprudence within the Ninth Circuit suggests that 
courts have long understood the relationship between cost-benefit 
analysis and public participation. It treats them as complements—
suggesting that heavy reliance on one might excuse a lack of 
reliance on the other and that each is appropriate in different 
circumstances. For over fifty years, Ninth Circuit judges have 
decided on the conditions under which cost-benefit analysis is 
necessary and those in which other tools are better suited. 
In Trout Unlimited v. Morton,245 the court held that a cost-benefit 
analysis is not a necessary part of an EIS. It states: 
 This conclusion rests upon the hard fact that there is sufficient 
disagreement about how environmental amenities should be 
valued to permit any value so assigned to be challenged on the 
grounds of its subjectivity. It follows that in most, if not all, 
projects the ultimate decision to proceed with the projects, 
whether made by Congress or an agency, is not strictly a 
mathematical determination. Public affairs defy the control that 
precise quantification of its issues would impose.246 
Essentially, the court is saying that in situations of methodological 
uncertainty a mathematical outcome would be deeply subjective. 
Moreover, it acknowledges that quantification alone cannot answer 
broader public affairs. 
Similarly, in Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v. 
Schlesinger,247 a panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled that the need for a 
cost-benefit analysis in an EIS was context-dependent: 
 The law in this Circuit is clear that a formal and mathematically 
expressed cost-benefit analysis is not always a required part of an 
EIS. This is not to say that a mathematical cost-benefit analysis is 
never required. If an alternative mode of EIS evaluation is 
insufficiently detailed to aid the decision-makers in deciding 
 
 244. See supra Section II.D. For a discussion of expanding the degree of deference that 
courts offer agencies under uncertain conditions, see Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, 
Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007). 
 245. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 246. Id. at 1286. 
 247. Columbia Basin Land Prot. Ass’n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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whether to proceed, or to provide the information the public 
needs to evaluate the project effectively, then the absence of a 
numerically expressed cost-benefit analysis may be fatal.248 
The court acknowledged the existence of alternative forms of 
evaluation but did not identify what they may be.249 It cabined 
reliance on such alternative methods, however, by noting that cost-
benefit analysis may be required in other contexts. 250 
Such judicial acceptance of collaborative analysis as an 
alternative to cost-benefit analysis under conditions of uncertainty 
may resolve a central debate within risk management literature—
how agencies should form policy under conditions of deep 
uncertainty and how courts should review such decisions.251 Judges 
appropriately deem agency decisions arbitrary and capricious252 
when they are premised on mischaracterizations of data or a 
knowing unwillingness to analyze credible information that is 
readily available.253 Yet, what should courts do when the requisite 
inputs are not available?254 
 
 248. Id. at 594 (citations omitted). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. In June 2015, the peer-reviewed Journal of Legal Studies devoted an issue to legal 
decision-making in conditions of deep uncertainty. In a series of articles, preeminent scholars 
discussed how agencies make decisions when the information one would want to premise a 
decision on is unknown. See Weisbach, supra note 222. 
 252. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). If Congress provides ambiguous statutory guidance on 
a point—as is almost always the case in risk assessment—then courts afford agencies 
discretion. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 253. WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(requiring the Bureau of Land Management to reassess climate change impacts of expanding 
coal mines when the agency stated that its decision would have no effect on climate change 
without providing a basis for those claims); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 
F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983) (vacating agency issuance of a landfill permit because the agency 
failed to account for the ways in which the project would affect the juvenile striped bass); N. 
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (remanding the decision not to 
list the Northern Spotted Owl to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service because the agency based 
its decision on a blatant mischaracterization of scientific information provided by an expert). 
 254. If judges require more exactitude than agencies can provide, absurd outcomes can 
result. After the Supreme Court articulated a standard requiring an agency to employ a 
method that “most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available 
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity,” 
Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 612 (1980) (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2018)), OSHA created estimates fully knowing that the risk analysis could 
vary millionfold depending on the model selected. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts 
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Thus far, scholarly analysis of agency behavior and judicial 
review amidst deep uncertainty has unfolded along three lines of 
reasoning. Each focuses on some nexus of data and discretion. First, 
empiricists tend to double down on data, calling for new models, 
more funding for research, and more time to discern accurate 
information.255 Second, administrative legal scholars tend to focus 
on courts’ assessments of agency actions amidst uncertainty and 
relaxed standards on experimental decisions.256 Adrian Vermeule 
describes this as a “rationally arbitrary decision” and suggests that 
even when data is not available, agencies must make some decision, 
which courts should not second guess.257 Third, ecologists and 
environmental law professors tend to advocate for the 
Precautionary Principle, which is that avoiding known harm 
should always be the tie-breaker.258 
Notably, each of the existing approaches overlooks the 
potential of collaborative analysis to function as a tie-breaker, a 
complementary instrument used to generate, evaluate, and 
incorporate ideas from expert members of the public. Agencies 
faced with deep uncertainty and a lack of high-quality quantitative 
data should adopt a democratic approach to risk management. 
Despite a long line of such cases, the court has not yet engaged 
with the specific circumstances under which alternative tools (such 
as collaborative analysis) can displace cost-benefit analysis. For 
this, I return to the five-factor test of when collaborative analysis 
works best: 
 
on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1402 n.74 (1992) (describing the 
plurality opinion in the Benzene Case as “an ideal illustration of a confused approach to risk 
assessment in the public health context”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and 
Economics—and the New Administrative State, 98 YALE L.J. 341 (1988). 
 255. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 235. Agencies sometimes do not have the luxury of 
waiting and must issue a decision within a specified time. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 256. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem 
of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 92 (2016) (suggesting that  
“agencies should be permitted to ‘guess’” what harms and benefits will be under conditions 
of uncertainty). 
 257. Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law, 44 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S475, S475 (2015). But see Masur & Posner, supra note 192, at 950 (“To review valuations 
on substantive grounds, courts need to second-guess judgments that lie at the heart of the 
agencies’ expertise.”). 
 258. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 151, at 139–40. 
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(1) a controversial decision or set of decisions must be made 
about a problem; 
(2) that decision is characterized by deeply uncertain  
risks that are difficult to quantify using analytic- 
data techniques; 
(3) that decision is also subject to evolving social, economic, 
health, or ecological conditions;  
(4) the consequences of the decision will be felt by a 
concentrated, identifiable set of stakeholders with deep 
interests and differing perspectives; and 
(5) no single agency has the resources or expertise to make 
and execute a decision alone. 
Judges have been implicitly going through these factors in deciding 
whether cost-benefit analysis is required.259 If they accept that a 
particular case satisfies these conditions, the decisions then turn to 
the procedural safeguards and democratic participation of the 
stakeholder group—analysis that may be informed by law or 
regulation dictating the collaborative analysis model. This 
appropriately shifts judicial review away from technical analysis  
of the availability of data and towards questions of  
procedural fairness. 
After establishing that democratic decision-making was the 
appropriate tool for a particular test, the court should turn to 
evaluating whether the particular application of the tool was 
appropriate. It needs to assess when stakeholder collaborations 
meet (or fail to meet) the procedural fairness standards embedded 
in the Administrative Procedure Act and various substantive 
statutes. Here, again, courts have long shown willingness to engage 
in precisely such analysis.260 It strikes at the heart of what they do 
as a matter of institutional competency.261 
 
 259. See cases cited supra notes 168-78, 254-632. 
 260. See infra notes 168-178 and related text. 
 261. Anya Bernstein, Differentiating Deference, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 52 (2016) (“[Courts] 
have considerable experience with evaluating procedures at a relatively high level  
of generality.”). 
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In this Article, I challenge the orthodox view that agencies 
should base their decisions on a quantified analysis of benefits and 
harms. Certainly, top-down risk management informed by 
quantitative analysis is the best approach in some contexts. But the 
widespread consensus that cost-benefit analysis is almost always 
the right approach presents an untested empirical claim that 
conflicts with practice. 
Identifying and describing collaborative analysis is the first step 
in a broader scholarly conversation about the need to cabin 
overreliance on data-driven policy. Analytic-data theory is useful 
in many situations, but it can prove harmful in others. Current 
over-reliance on top-down decision-making has led scholars to 
overlook a widely used alternative technique. Acknowledging the 
ubiquity of collaborative analysis in the administrative state invites 
a variety of additional scholarship, ranging from assessment of the 
efficacy of the method to variations on the tool of stakeholder 
collaborations that satisfy the same function. Perhaps most 
importantly, this Article serves to integrate practice and data from 
other fields to challenge current legal scholarship that insists on a 
sometimes-questionable policymaking tool. 
Just as data-based decisions must be adequately responsive to 
relevant science, so too must collaboration-based decisions 
conform to some standard of acceptability. The calculus of the 
procedural integrity of collaborations is far more within the realm 
of courts’ abilities, however, than is second-guessing agencies’ data 
analysis.262 Also, FACA clarifies that agencies may not delegate 
their ultimate decision-making authority to stakeholder groups. 
This ensures that, however influential a stakeholder group is, the 
agency is ultimately legally and politically accountable for making 
sound decisions. 
Further, collaborative decisions do not override the distinct 
procedural protections embedded into NEPA and substantive 
elements of other statutes, like the Endangered Species Act. Indeed, 
it is within the confines of the overlapping statutory regimes—
imposing requirements that decisions incorporate “best available 
 
 262. Cf. Masur & Posner, supra note 192, at 950 (arguing that courts can and should 
engage in a heightened review of cost-benefit analysis). 
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science”—that Congress guards against irresponsible stakeholder 
or agency action. Notice-and-comment periods, which some 
statutes require, continue to play an essential role in democratic 
accountability by incorporating the voices of people who care about 
the decision but are not members of the collaboration. Collectively, 
these statutory guideposts cabin the most serious concerns  
about collaborative analysis, inappropriately displacing analytic-
data analysis. 
A fundamental question underlying democratic decision-
making is: Who gets a seat at the table? Agencies are struggling to 
make such determinations on a case-by-case basis, as with the 
founders of the WACHWG deciding to allocate each regional 
group of Alaskan Native Communities one of twenty seats. 
Alternatively, the group could have granted one position to each of 
the forty to fifty communities, or a single place to represent all 
Alaskan Native Communities. Such decisions influence substantive 
outcomes. Decisions made by the WACHWG would likely be far 
more favorable to Alaskan Native interests if each of the forty to 
fifty communities received a position, and there was only a single 
seat reserved for non-native hunting guides. In other words, 
deciding who is eligible to participate, and to what degree, is a vital, 
sometimes determinative question in collaborative analysis. 
Scholarly work on answering this question is not only theoretically 
interesting, but also important to informing judicial inquiry 
surrounding the procedural fairness of stakeholder groups. 
Similarly, the various tools of democratic decision-making are 
relatively poorly defined. By contrast, scholars tend to be more 
familiar with the analytic-data tools of top-down risk 
management—such as cost-benefit analysis, feasibility analysis, 
and min-max—and the corresponding degrees of judicial 
deference. Although ecologists and social scientists have provided 
some typologies of collaborative governance, legal analysis of the 
rules governing various tools, and judicial deference paid to them, 
is relatively undeveloped.263 Future scholarship may engage with 
whether, and how, voting processes work in real-world 
collaborative groups and the lengths to which judicial inquiry of 
 
 263. For a rough typology of various democratic decision-making tools agencies use—
including, but going well beyond, stakeholder collaborations—see BRADSHAW, supra note 8, 
at 20–24. 
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procedural fairness should track different tools within the cannon 
of democratic decision-making. 
More broadly, the study of collaborative analysis also 
contributes to the persistent, ongoing debate about the relative 
merits of federalism versus decentralization in agency 
policymaking.264 It acknowledges that analytic decision strategies 
are necessary for some contexts but utterly inappropriate in others. 
This mirrors a generalized consensus—extending beyond the risk 
management arena—that some categories of decisions are best 
suited to collaborative analysis. 
Behavioral economics had a considerable effect on legal 
scholars, some of whom now believe that people’s decision-making 
biases render them ineffective at making decisions. In conditions of 
imperfect government data assessment, however, resource users 
may be best positioned to assess conditions and forecast resource 
availability and social responses to various policy choices. The 
iterative nature of collaboration—relative to the single-shot nature 
of regulation—suggests that the decision-making body acts as a 
system that can continuously update itself and adapt to new 
information and changed conditions. Further, the integration of 
non-scientific factors to influence policy decisions makes sense in 
situations where the data or models are deeply uncertain. Updating 
law and theory to integrate collaborative analysis has considerable 
potential to improve agency function. 
  
 
 264. Esty, supra note 220. 
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